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The point has been reachedwhere theinterrelation ofthe various fields so far examinedmust be studied froma broader angle. This will not be possible,however, withoutgoing intosome rather detailed argument.
We shall be mainlyconcerned with thefamous hypothesisof the "international solidarityof money markets"which apparentlywas first enunciated byLord Goschen in hisTheory of theForeign Ex. clwnges, 1861. It hassince been discussedin the literaturein varying degree and for differentpurposes. it is in the mainaccepted bymost economists as correctlyexpressing theinterdependence ofthesemar- kets, at least undera regime of the goldstandard. Itsdetailedargu. ment and implications,however, are notso well knownamong con- temporary economists,althoughmany of theirstatements implyvery definite opinionswhich should bemade explicit,especiallyas they often are relatedto proposals forreform of themonetary order. The subjects ofthis and thefollowing chaptersare of central significance forany investigationconcerned withthe international spread of businesscycles,even if it were dealingless centrallywith their monetaryand financialaspects. Ifwe may usea simile: we are enteringupon a discussionof the variousgauges and measuring devices which(allegedly) showand controlthe state ofactivity of theinternational financialmechanism. Ourproblem isto find out whetherthese variousdevices_goldpoints, maximumdiffer- ences of interestrates, etc.areas accurate andas effective as generally believed.
Section 2. TheSolidarity ifypothesis
Without goinginto historicaldetail,we state theassumption of theinternationalsolidarity ofmoney marketsdirectlyas follows: When bvo (ormore)countries areon the gold standardthen there exist definitelimits forthe absolutedifferencesbetween theirshort- term interestrates. Theactualdifferencesat a givenmoment de-
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pend on the absolute stand of the exchange rates at the same moment,
which in turn can vary only between the gold points of the currencies.
To illustrate: a creditor of country A investing his funds in country
B has to take into account the risk he runs because of the possible
depredation of the exchange of B in terms of the currency of A.
When both countries are on the gold standard the limits of this
risk can be foreseen. The possible loss for the creditors of B in A
will be greatest when the currency of A is at the gold export point
in respect to B; then currency of B in terms of currency of A is at
the most expensive of all possible prices. If the currency of A is at
the gold import point, then currency of B in terms of currency of
A is at the lowest of all possible prices. In the first case B's currency
can only fall and presumably will do so more or less quickly; in
the second it can only rise and presumably wifi do so more or less
quickly.'
As a consequence in the first case, the rate of interest, which causes
funds to be transferred from A to B, must at least be higher in 13
by as large a percentage as is necessary to compensatc for this risk.
In the second case the rate of interest should be lower in B than in
A.
For exchange rates somewhere between the two gold points exactly
the same considerations are valid. Thus we arrive at a scale of
permissible short-term interest rate differentials which must fill con-
tinuously the entire widths between the gold points. Though the
absolute levels of the interest rates in the two countries arc indeter-
minate, there is nevertheless for each absolute position of the ex-
change rate precisely one absolute differentialor rather a definite
range2which is in agreement with the functioning of the gold
standard.
When the interest rates of the two countries conform, then we
say that their money markets are in a state of solidarity; when the
1The rapidity of adjustment is at least expected to be greater than the period
for which the investment is made in B, whatever its absolute, but very likely high,
rapidity.
As a matter of fact, gold movements not only took place when the exchange
had reached the specie points, but also, in the opinion of the trade, they be-
gan often when the exchange was still as much as four or five points distant.
This however must be taken with a grain of salt, since for the different indi-
vidual operators, or for different classes of operators, there are (slightly) dif-
ferent gold points. In 1927, for example, American gold was even sold at a loss
In London.
'Numerical examples will be given below in Tables 74 and 75; here we are
concerned only about establishing the general relationship between the absolute
stand of the exchange rate and the correlated interest rate differentials.
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differentials do not conform with therespective absolutepositj of the exchange rates, i.e., when theyexceed the
respective 'pe. missible limits,' thenwe say that theyvioLatethatsolidarityas de. fined, i.e., the principles of thegold standard.
The reasons are obvious whythe differentialsshouldnotesce(yi the permissible limits whenthe gold standardmechanisni smoothly: the largest possibleloss or largestpossible gain,
respec. tively, at each quotation ofthe exchangerate can beexpressedas a percentage of the sum invested.The differencebetween therates of interest in thetwo countries mustbe expectedto fluctuatebe- tween these two rates ofexchange rate risk,since aninterestrate differential which wouldmore thancompensate theexchangerate risk would beexpected immediatelyto induce a flowof fundswhich would tendto reduce theinterest ratedifferentialat leastto its maximum permissiblelimit. it is onlywhen thegoldstandurd mechanism is notworking accordingto expectationsthat other differentialscan be observed. Sowe would here havean exactquanti- tative criterion ofwhether ornot this mechanism
functioned,and we would be ableto identify thetimes when itbroke downor was violated bygovernment or otherintervention fromthe outside,or whenpermanent new risks
appearedpresumablyof a structural nature.3
'To our knowledgethe first statisticalstudy of therelationship betweenes-
change ratesand short-temiinterest ratedifferentials is byGeorge Clare. In-
vestigating the'continentalinvestment demand"in the chapteron foreign ex-
change of hisA Money MarketPrimerandKey to Exchanges,
London, 1891,
Chart 15, Clarecompares the interestrate differentialsLondon minusParis
and the exchangerate Londonon Pans JuFv throughOctober for1886-1888.
The firstsystematic discussionis in N. E.Well, DieSolidarltift der Geld-
marlcte. LiiiStudle überdie Verschiedenheltdes GlelchzeitigenDiskontthlz4
Vei-schiedener Landei-,Frankfurt,1903. Weillcompared forseveral European countries and theUnited Statesshort-term interestrate differentialswith the
correspondingexchange ratesand the riskmargin (definedas the maximum
gain or lossdue to thefluctuation ofthe exchangerates between the gold
points). Hefound that,except forcertain periodswhen the explanationwas
obviouslypoliticalevents or theeconomic situation,the interestrate aifferen-
tials neverexceeded therisk margin.The statisticalmaterial compiledby Well
is heterogeneous,
covering, foreach pair ofcountries, di(Icrentperiods between
1880 and 1901;
Weilt sometimesused annualaverages, sometimesmonthly data,
sometimes dailyquotations. Charts of dailyinterest ratedifferentials andexchange ratescoering 1904-
1907 onlyare publishedIn twopapers in theZcftschrlft fürIlandelswlsse*-
schaftlicheForsclwng,following thepublication ofWell's book: EugenSchma.
lenbach, "Derfurs des
Pfund-SterlingWechsels," Vol.z, 1906-1907,pp. 241-
256; andWalter Malilberg,'Der Kusde
'Frankenwechsels,'" Vol.in, 1908-
1909,pp. 397-415.Hans Neisser,"DesInternationaleceldmarkt vor wid nash
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Section 3. Gold Points and Exchange Rates
This first description of the solidarity hypothesis suffices at
least to justify our next procedure, that is to say, the searchfor the
gold points and the discussion of the significanceattributed to
them. It is clear that there still remain many aspects andimplica-
tions of the hypothesis requiring examination.Besides the exchange
riskwhich would be taken care of by the above observationsand
rulesthere is the ordinary business risk of investing in aforeign
country. It is obvious that such risks may accountfor the fact that
the various "permissible" interest rate differentials in some countries
tend to stay at the maximum of the entire range ofdifferentials that
exists for each separate position of a given exchange rate,while for
rates of other countries, where this risk issmaller, they fluctuate
along its entire breadth.
The gold standard is generally viewed as the monetary system
with the greatest amount of freedom for the "automatic"forces of
the various markets, chieflybut not exclusivelythe money mar-
kets. The gold points have an essential place in this picture,because
we must envisage that the costs(in terms of money) of shipping
gold either way between two countries are the soleresults of the
traditionally enumerated factors (cost of transportation insurance,
loss of interest4 while gold is en route, handling fees,etc.) and in
dein Kriege," Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, Vol. 29, 1829, pp.111-226, con-
tinued the two charts mentioned above to July 1914, andcharted also the
monthly averages of interest rate differentials and exchange ratesfor the sets,
Berlin-London, 1900-July 1914, and Paris-London, 1880-1913.Neisser's in-
teresting study is based on several more sets,for which he does not publish
either the data or the charts. Neisser nevertheless summarizeshis findings for
each set. His investigations confirm the view of the authorsmentioned above,
namely, that except for certain disturbances, a closecorrelation between the
movement of short-term interest rate differentialsand the exchange rates ex-
isted all the time the world was on the gold standard. Theauthors mentioned
above do not adjust their series for seasonal variations.
'The reader will note that we encounter here once more oneof those in-
tricate interdependencies that are typical inthis field: the rate of interest enters
significantly into the gold points, a low rate bringingthem closer together, a
high one friving them apart. On the otherhand however this very same short-
term rate is partly dependent on thewidth of the gold points, because horn
that depends how much the rate may be at variancewith thosof other coun-
tries for which, of course, the sameinterdependency holds. This is a good illus-
tration of the typical circularity or implicitness socharacteristic of most eco-
nomic problems. Their correctmathematical formulation, let alone solution,
is no mean task.
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no way subject to government controlor that of thecentral bank. If such control existed themovements of gold wouldcease to be the results of market forcesonly, and the goldstandard in thatCOfl. y would not function automatically. The
arguments againstthe system seem to be derived, withoutexception, from theassumption of its essentially, indeedfully, automaticcharacter. Thisis often expressed in variousways, though all criticismsultimatelyamount to precisely that. The criticismsare directed either againstthe theorej. cal model, or against the(true or alleged)actuality of theprewar and post.Wor1dWJperiods (more frequentlyagainst the latter only, which howeveris presumably heldto be equivalentwith the former). Theoreticalmodel and actualmanifestationare for all practical purposes identified.
The first theoreticaltreatment of theinterconnection ofexchange rates goes back to R.Cantillon, whoeven went so faras to describe covering operations dueto seasonalvariations ina manneras perfect as the farmore famousexposition by ViscountCosehene published one hundredand thirty oddyears later. But thetheorywas really setup by A. A. Cournotin I838.It wasgeneralized to r3 markets byH. E. Bray8 in1922, Cournothavingtreated only
Consider twocenters° i andfand let CJ bethe rate ofexchange between thecurrency of £ and thecurrency ofj. Then Cjg will be the reciprocal of Cj:
(1) C412.
If we haver currencies,excluding £= j, we have r (r- 1) permuta. tions of thesubscripts i andj. But because ofequation (1) this sur Ia nature diiConin,ce 1734,LOnd(,n 1755;rcpublishJ by H.
Higgs for theRoyal EconomicSociety, London1931. 'The Theoryof the ForeignExchang, 1861. TRCCFiC,ChCS °' lesFrincipesMatheinatiques deIa RlcjiesseParis, 1838, Chapter m, lastEnglish edition,Irving Fisher,editor, New York,1927. Coumot retwed to
economic problems inthese two laterworks: Pr "Ipcs dela Théoyje
des RicheesParis, 1863,and RevueSo,nmaj,e desDoctrines Economaqu,,
Paris. 1877.The lattertwo worJcsare particularlyimportant for the theoryof international tradebecause of theirdisc55t011 ofcoutempora,. literature. 'H. E. Bray,"Rates of Exchange,"
American Mathena,lea! Monthly, Vol.29,
1922,2571 Cf. alsoC. C. Evans,Mafhematjcaiintrodudjon to Ec
nonzjcs, New York,1930, Chaptervu. 'For theargument it isirrele%.ant whetherthese "centers"arc in the same
country or not.Here weassume ofcourse the latter. The
problem whether the
theory ofInternational tradeis differentIn kind fromthat of internaltrade Is
answered In theafflnnative byRicardo and Mill,in the negativeby Cournot.
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reduces to r(r - 1 )/2 independent ratios, i.e., in our case to six.
it is possible to reduce this number still further. This reduction
is based on the simple consideration that the following mustalso
be true in an ideal setup:
(2)
This "cross rate" expresses the fact that the ratio of, say, dollars to
sterling in New York and London cannot differ (save for the costs
of the operation) from, say, dollars to francs and francs to sterling.
If this were not so it would pay to buy sterling not directly in
New York but via Paris. The high degree of perfectionand the
closeness of all calculations referred to above make it highly im-
probable that differences, other than those for the transfer costs
involved, could be maintained for any noticeable length of time.
The number of relationships based on equation (2) isequal to
(r - 1) (r - 2 )/2. There were, however, r( r - 1) /2 quantitiesCj
and this number reduces to
r(r-1)(r_l)(r_2)_i.
2 2-
that is, in our case there are three independent exchange rates for
the four countries. Obviously there is no cause to prefer C5 over
C. It will depend on the convenience with which data can be
collected. But what is the meaning of the dollar rising or the franc
falling? Why should one representation rather than the other
be preferred? If one studies the exchange rates from the pointof
view of one country only, no problem exists. But we want tostudy
the exchange rates of several countries simultaneously and use a
cycle approach. In that case an expansion should bedistinguished
from a contraction, but it is entirely arbitrary whether the same
occurrence is called "expansion" or"contraction."
mD D,:DonA=Aa
Di: D on B = B.
Di: D on C = C.
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mA A,: A on B rising (falling) B on A falling (rising)
A,: A on C rising (falling)implies C on A falling (rising)
A,: A on D rising (falling) D on A falling (rising)
laBBi: B on A falling (rising)A1
B.: B on C rising (falling)impliesC on B falling (rising)
B,: B on D rising (falling) D on B falling (rising)
InCC,: C on A falling (rising)
(1: C on B falling (rising)
A,
= B.
Ca: C on D rising (falling)impliesD on C falling (rising)SOLIDARITY OF THE MONEY MARKETS
The minus sign expresses the respective inverse movement. For
a larger number of countries the same regularity obviously obtains.
By permutation we can put any of the four countries intoany of
the four positions A-D.
By A on B, A on C, etc. we mean how muchcurrency of A has
to be paid for a unit of currency of B,C.... This defines the
above-mentioned reciprocal relationship and hence producesthe
inverse phase movements in B,C.... Foreign exchanges are
quoted in the indicated way in allmoney markets except one, Lon-
don. There quotations of foreign currenciesindicate how much
foreign currency is needed in order to buy, in London,one pound
sterling. The rate of, say, dollar to sterlingmust therefore be the
rame in New York and London, i.e., not the reciprocal iione place
of that of the other. Negligible differences1°between the quotations
in these two places are caused by differencesin the costs of transfer
or by imperfection of arbitrage, or both.
If one of the countries is GreatBritain, our scheme can bere-
duced by simply transforming theLondon quotations into the
others. The British notation issometimes called in the literature
"quantity notation" (sincea particular fIxed quantity, i.e., one
pound sterlingis the measuring stick),as distinguished from the
"price notation," which is the orilinryform of stating the amount
of domestic currency needed forthe purchase of a unit of the for-
eign currency.
The slight differencesmentioned do not matter since they dis-
appear completely, certainly under the goldstandard. Our statistics
are monthly values, computedon the basis of either daily or weekly
data and any noticeabledifference between the direct andthe in-
verse quotation vanishes for all practicalpurposes; the great speed
of arbitrage1'operations easily takes care of that,
For the purposes ofa study of cyclical behavior of exchange
rates it is therefore not of realimportance whether Aon B or B
on A inverted is taken as one and thesame, or A on B series, e.g.,
when it is diflicultor impossible to obtain Aon B data for part of
"0 the influence of differencesin the life of bills tradedupon this equalization and hence the needto define "par" accordingly, cf.section 4 below. "This is an assumption onlyat present. There isevery reason to believe that it is true. Butwe shall find that arbitrage working throughthree centers, which should not makeany difference at all, does not fulfill tillspractical and theoretical condition. On thecontrary a rather baffling behavioris revealed in many Instances.
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the period. The necessity of inversion12 actually does not arise
except in the interwar period where there is at any rate a far more
considerable break in the behavior of the series, just as was noticed
previously for other activities. Furthermore checks for periods
where both forms of information are available have shown that
differences are negligible. This is also concurred in by operators
in the field of foreign exchange. If we were interested in exchange
arbitrage operations between any two places directly, then there
would be room for objections, but they do not apply here.
Each exchange rate series has at least three critical points: mint
par, the upper, and the lower gold (or specie) points.13 All are of
importance when one desires to describe the behavior of the series
historically or interpret them in regard to such notions as the
equilibrium of the balance of payments. The gold points are tradi-
tionally understood to be the highest and lowest limits between
which the actual data can possibly fluctuate, orin a less stringent
interpretationmay fluctuate without violating the principles of
the gold standard.
The traditional view until recently wasas expressed by classi-
cal as well as by modem writersthat the balance of payments is
in equilibrium only when the exchange rate is at mint parity. Since
mint par is always defined without ambiguity, as the ratio between
two amounts of metal and admixtures, we would indeed have an
absolutely objective way of finding out when as complex an eco-
nomic phenomenon as the balance of payments is in equilibrium
or, more correctly, describes an equilibrium.
Under a gold standard the possible values ofare supposed to
have an upper and a lower bound in the gold import and gold ex-
port points, respectively. One specffic value within this range, say
Cj' = l/CH, is called "mint par" and is what is customarily, though
loosely, described as "parity." It is better, however, to use the term
mint par, unless no misunderstanding is possible.14 If the currencies
UThe reason why we shall need a series A on B instead of B on A (which
is of course the same economic relationship) lies in the connection these series
find with a particular form of the interest rate differential. There we are also
free to choose A-B or B-A. There is no inherent advantage in either form.
But once an exchange rate has been chosen, only one form of a differential can
be used with it and vice versa.
The latest extensive discussion of gold points, in the framework of mone-
thy theory, is to be found in John M. Keynes, A Treatise on Money, London,
1931; and in P. Einzig, The Theory of Forward Exchange, London, 1937.
' Mintpar need riot necessarily halve the distance between the gold points,
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move toward one of the gold points, a correction byone of thetwo (or both) markets is indicated andvillunder a freeSysten variably take place with great speed. Theassumption is furfl,.
more that the rates cannot go beyond thespecie points. Bothstate. mentsthat adjustments will take place,e.g., by gold shipments
and that the boundsare not exceededare subjectto emphjcalin- vestigation.
The definition of parity needsto be expanded to allowfor lime Mint par is rigorously definedas a ratio betweentwo different quantities of the metal. But thisratio will apply inactuality onlyif no time elapses in the exchange.Similarly all otherparities imply time. When telegraphictransfers can he made,the theoreticalpars need not be corrected.In all other instancesthe prevailingrate of discount (for thetype of credit instrumentinvolved) andthe length of the billtraded must beconsidered whendetermining whether actually C11/C,. Since bills ofvery differentlengths are simultaneously tradedbetween hvocountries we havenot Only one scale of equivalentvalues of C, and 1/C,1but asmany as ther6 are types of bills. Arbitrage,even between two placesonly, is there- fore a vastlymore varied and complicatedactivity than itmay first seem to be. Finallyvariations in the priceof goldtransportation costs, etc., have to betaken intoaccount. For ourpurposes it is sufficient to understandthe influenceof the goldprice; we need not go intocomparative detaiL's
In determiningwhether currenciesare quoted atpar, allowance must therefore bemade for thenature of the data.If they involve telegraphic transfersno adjustment isnecessary; when theyare quoted for sightdrafts it wouldbe. Howeverwhen usingmonthly averages, theseadjustments becomesmall andmay cancel out; at any rate we havenot attemptedto introducecorrections. The reader will judgefor himselfwhether this isjustified, We shall later determine thenumber andsignificance of deviationsof eachex- change rate fromparity. This willrefer to mintpar. The point isnot without interest,because of themeaning given mintpar by many economists in tryingto determinewhether acurrency is in "equilib- rium."
Since the costof transpol.tatjouof goldmay be greater inone direction than
in the other.
A good illustrationis to hefound in \V.A. Brown, Jr., TheInternatIonal Gold StandardReinter,.efe(iVol. i,p. 708 if. where theLondon_NYork
rate is discussed
for 1928 inregard to both thegold points andmint parity.
174175
--
GOLD POINTS AND EXCHANGE RATES
This leads over from the definition of parity to its use and thence
to the interpretation, it is from the latter that it assumes itshis-
toric role because economists up to most recent times have sought
to identify the equilibrium rateofexchange with mint par. This
introduces a difficult and much disputed topic.
If this criterion be accepted, then we make the rather startling
discoverycf. Tables 41, 51, and 52 belowthat none of the six
balances of payments (which we do not know but of which we
would thus know a decisive property) was in "equilibrium" except
in rare cases, which are clearly the exceptions to whatever must
have been their "normal" and perhaps typical "disequilibrium."
Furthermore when mint par of the currency of a given country
is observed, it is not necessarily simultaneously at mint parwith a
third or fourth country with which it also communicates. The sig-
nificance of this will become apparent presently.
It is best to state the argument in the words of Jacob Viner: "In
their discussion of the foreign exchanges, the writers on the theory
of international trade with apparently almost complete unanimity
expound a particular error of minor practical importance but re-
vealing lack of due precision in exposition or thought. They hold
that when the balance of payments is even, the exchanges willbe at
their mint par. The correct statement is that when thebalance of
payments is even, the exchanges will be somewherewithin the
export and import points. The mint par has significanceonly as a
base point from which to determine the specie exportand import
points. Equilibrium between the amount of foreignbills demanded
and offered is as likely to be reached at any one as at anyother
rate within the limits of the specie points. Exceptfor the approxi-
mately £xed limits to the range of possible fluctuationof the ex-
changes under an international metallic standard, there is nobasis
for differentiating the theory of the foreign exchangesbetween two
currencies having a common metallic standard, onthe one hand,
and between two currencies on different standards, onthe other
hand."18
'Jacob Viner, Studies In the Theory of InternationalTrade, 1937, P. 379.
Vmer remarks in a footnote that he too had committedthat error, but that he
was in the "excellent company" ofRicardo,.S. Mill, Bastable, Marshall, and
Taussig. The error was pointed out by H. D. White,The French InternaUoiwi
Accounts, 1880-1912, 1933, p. 156. It will be noted thatin the above quotation
the wrong statement Is replaced by a more p'ausible one, noproof being
offered for it, probably because White, whom Viner quotes.Is more speclBc
and since the point is easily seen. It is however not correctwhen Viner attrlb-178
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Section 4. The Statistics of Gold Points am! ErcluingeRates
We shall now turn to an examination of the actual data
ORgold
points on whose basis wc wish to examine the validity ofthe soIid.
ity hypotheses. It will be carried out for theprewar and intevar
periods. Although in general we relegated thepostwar figuresand their interpretation to a somewhat secondaryrole-once having
established the great confusion ofrelationships_we shallflow use some of our interwar figures more extensively.
The reason is chieflya statistical one: it is extremelydifficult to obtain actual values forprewar gold points, especially for theearlier years; it is also very difficult even for thepostwar years.'7 Butwe obtained as complete informationabout the gold pointsinvolving New York as can reasonably beexpected. These figurescan be compared with the ordinarysources; and aside from theinforma.. tion they actually give, theyserve as our most importantcontrol over the figures collected for theother periods andpairs of Countries which we mustaccept, lacking really first-ratesources. It will be seen that we can thus obtaina picture of sufficientaccuracy to deal with the solidarityhypothesis in a decisiveway.
Table 33 contains thegold points of thesix exchangerates for the prewar period.For the three ratesinvolving London themost natural source is theEconanzjgt, whichprinted data beginning September 15, 1877. Webegin with thesedata, whichmerit some lengthier discussionssince the Economistis such a widelyused source of economicstatistics and since theevaluation of its data will help in judgingthose from othersources where a control is more difficult.
The mostnoteworthy fact is theapparent stability of the gold points as reportedby the Economistover almost fortyyears, as can be seen fromTable 32. Thereports appearedevery week and these
utes the change toWhite. The was made by A. C. l>igouin, "The Foreign Exchanges," Quarie.lyJournaof EconomksNos'eniber 1922, reprintedin Essays in AppliedEconomies London,1923,p. 158-173. Arecent discussion of the entireuroblem to whichwe shall re er againbelow is given by R. Nurkse, "Conitions of International
Monetary Eqiiilibrjtini"Essays iJUt- nafloji4 Finance, No.4, PrincetonUniversity Press,1945, "Cf. Keynes: "Theprecise magnitudeof the stretchbetween the gold points deserves morescientific considerationthan it hasyet received," op. cit., Vol.ii, p. 331.


















Date following name of source refers to year for which quotation was made.
Economist, Sept. 22, 1877-Aug. 19, 1916. Also quoted by N. E. Weill,
Die Solidarliät der Geldmarkte, 1903.
'Henry Deutsch, Bullion, Coins, Bills, Stocks, Shares and Options, 2nd ed.,
1910, P. 23; 4.87 given by Paigrave's Dictionary of Political Economy, 1899,
vol. ii, p. 227.
4Modern Cain bist, 23rd ed., 1893,p. 240.
Otto Swoboda, Arbitrage, 14th ed.,p. 711; 3.5% expenses included.
Ottomar Haupt, Arbitrages et Parites, 8th ed., 1894,p. 485. Also quoted by
0. }1aut, Geld, Silber und Wahrung, 1877,P. 144, no interestincluded.




































($ per point London
4.866 ($ per £)
Economist b 4.827
H. Deutsch 1910' 4.8762
4.83
0. Swoboda 1913 4.8836
0. Swoboda 1901 4.84
Economist 4.89
0. Haupt 1894k 4.845
P. Einzig 1913' 4.89
0. Swoboda 1913 4.8495
0. Haupt 1894 4.896
P. Einzig 1913 4.8509
Tate 4.90
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TABLE 33, continued
Berlin-New York
'Op. cit.,p. 199. bOp. cit p. 92








'Op. cit.,p. 711; 3%expenses included;4% premiumat the Banque de
France.
'Carl Heiligenstade,
Jahrbucher fürNatlonalökonomieand Statistik, 3rd



















421.85 N. E. Weill' 416.80
421.85 Reichsbank' 418.80







521.50 0. Haupt 1894b
514.80
521.56 0. Haupt 1877'
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TABLE 33, Continued
Berlin-London
'Op. cit., p. 239.
bOp. cit., p. 71; 20.49 given by 0. Haupt, 1871, p. 144.
Carl Heiligenstadt, Jahrbücher fur Nationalökonomle und Statistik, 3rd
series, vol. 4, 1892, p. 817. Average of figures translated from graph. See below,
Table 62 and 63.
'Economist, Sept. 15, 3877-Oct. 25, 1879.
Op. cit., p.21.
'EconomIst, Oct. 25, 1879-Aug. 19, 1916.
'Die Relchsbank 1876-1910, 1912, P. 212, Table 82.
bcit., p. 340; 2.25% expenses included; same export point given by Pal-
grave, op. cit., p. 221; import point given as 20.52.
$ Op. cit.,p. 199.
'Op. cit., pp. 353-354; 2.25% expenses included.








(M per £) point London








N. F. Well 20.335
0. Swobodak 20.34 20.505
0. Haupt 1894' 20.34 20.505
0. Swoboda 1913' 20.34
Reichsbank' 20.34
B. Winklerk 20.35 20.51
H. Deutsch 20.38





Range 20.3 1-20.37 20.495-20.53
Median 20.34 20.505SOLIDARITY OF TIlE MONEY MARKETS
TABLE 33, continued
'Op. cit., p. 144, no interest, courtage, or conimissioxs.
H. C. Walter, Foreign Exchangc.r and Foreign Debts,1926, p. 17.
Op. cit., p. 233.
d Op. cit.,p. 19.
The Economist, Sept. 15, l877-Aug. 19,1916; same figures given by Pal. grave, op. cit., p. 227.
'Op. cit., pp. 353-354; 1.5%expenses included.
'Op. cit., p. 340; 1.5% expenses included; 4%prcnnLlrn at the Banque de France.
'Op. cit., p. 488.
are all the changes. Such great stabilitythrows into doubt the
accuracy of the Economist's goldpoints. An almost complete
stability has, to besure, often been asserted by foreignexchange
operators But here it exceeds allexpectations, On the other hand, in many bookson foreign exchanges publishedduring the same period and in the worksdealing with the solidarityhypothesis, the gold pointsare freely used and apparentlyconsidered characteris. tic for actualoperations of that period.
The Economist givesvery little informationconcerning its figures; it is only pointedout that theseare "the exchange points at which gold comes toor leaves the Bank ofEngland." Nothing is said as to the type ofaverage these gold pointsare supposed to repre.








(fc per £) point London
25.225 (fcper)
0. Haupt 1877' 25.10
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TABLE 33, concluded
1Op cit., p. 93; 4% premium at the Banque de France; also quoted by 0.
Haupt, Gold, Silber und Wuhrung, 1877, p. 144 (not including interest, cour-
tage, or commission).
' Op. cit., p. 200. 'Op. cit., p. 86.
4Die Relcksbank 1876-1910, 1912, p. 212, Table 82.
Op. cit., p. 58.
sent. Does each of these points represent an arithmetic mean of the
cost of shipping various types of gold such as fine gold, standard
gold, gold bars, gold Coins? Or does point represent the actual
arithmetic mean of all the Bank of England gold shipments of the
week? Or are these the modal points where gold exports or imports
are at the maximum volume? Since no information is given by the
Economistnor, as a matter of fact, by anyone else, e.g., by the
many previous textbook writers on foreign exchangeno certain
answer is possible.2° Moreover it is a serious restriction of these
figures that they refer only to the Bank of England, since the cen-
Data appear also occasionally in the Financial News and in the Commer-
cial and Financial Chronicle, and although these periodicals are generally val-
uable sources for economic statistics, we decided not to use their gold points.
Some of them coincide with a few to be found in our tables and we do not
duplicate entries. Many textbooks seem to have taken theirs from these two
sources, although it may just as well have been the other way around.
We mention here finally that we consider throughout this discussion the gold
export point of A as equivalent with the gold import point of B in the relation
of the currencies A and B, although there are, conceivably, slight differences;
however they are too line to measure. When London is involved then there are
instead of fur gold points for a pair of countries only two because of the so
called 'quantity" quotation of the foreign exchanges there. But for each of the







Panty Gold un port
per lOOfc) point Path
81.00 (Mperloofc)
0. Swoboda 19O1 80.50 81.30
0. Hauptb 80.51 81.32
0. Swoboda 1913' 80.55
Reichsbank 80.60
N. E. Wcill 80.77 81,35
Reichsbankd 81.40
0. Swoboda 1913 81.49
Range 80.50-80.77 81.30-81.49
Median 80.55 81.35SOLiDARITY OF THEMONEYMARKETS
tral bankcan, besides manipulatingthe price ofgold, always ship at muchlower cost thancommercial banksor operato Therefore thedifference betweenthese goldpointsmay benar- rower than that for thestrictly commercialones, thusgiving the illusion thata much smallerinterest ratedifferentialisimposed upon the countries concernedthan actuallymay have beenthecase. Since, as we shallsee in detail (cf.page 269),even verysmall differences in thedata havevery considerable
consequences, this is a mostimportant observation.
In the September15, 1877 issue,the Economisthints thatthe gold pointsit publishesare those supplied byErnest Seyd,author. among other recognized
publicationsofa book entitled
Bullion and ForeignExchange, London,1868, Becauseof its earlypublica- tion it may beinteresting to givesome details fromSeyd's book. Seyd pointsout (page 386if.) that finegold is shippedfrom the Bank of Englandto France whenthe exchangesare from 25.075to 25.125 francs.Howeversome shipperscommence toexport gold even at 25.10 to25.15 francs.It is interestingto note that2&125 francs is theEconomist'sexport point,Britain toFrance. Ifone disregards thedifference intime andassumes no changesin the costs of shippinggold between1868 and1877, onecan conclude that theEconomlst's goldpoints are inall probabilityrough modal points at whichthe gold(fine gold)influx into,and effluxfrom, the Bank ofEngland reachedthe maximumvolume. Asvery rough modal points,the stabilityof theEconomist'sdata becomesa little more plausible.
Seydgoes on to showthat thegold pointswillvary with dif- ferent formsof goldshipped. ForAmerican goldcoins, theBritish-
Frenchexport pointwould beabout 25.10francs. Withrefinable
gold, it wouldbe about25.1218 francs.(This is dueto the fact that gold refiningwas cheaperin Francethan inEngland.) ForBritish sovereigns shipped,the exchangewould beabout 25.06francs. Seyd alsopoints outthat goldshipped fromFrance to England cost about25.368 francsif goldbars and25.396 francsif Napoleons. He concludesthat thegoldexport pointrange is from25.10 to
25.125 andthe goldimport pointrange from25.275 to 25.30francs.
The marginbetween thetwo goldexchangepoints is thusapproxi-
matelyone per centof mintparity.21 Besides thedatafurnishedby theEconomistwe use thecom-
putations indifferenthandbooksprepared forcambists andbanks.
The figuresfor mintparity aregiven in TableS6 below.
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11iare various such works, many of which have appeared in
jnwron_s editions22 and all of which were constantly used in prac-
Generally there are no changes at all reported from one edi-
ijto another, but it was not possible to obtain continuous series
f the many editions. As will be seen from Table 33 the differences
iie data of different editions of the same work are as slight as
he for diflerent works, another indication of both the great
iability and the merely representative, average character of the
1nfocmation given. Many checks have been made, whenever pos.
sible, by consultation of actual bank records in New York, which
were scannedfor gold shipments at various times, for different firms
nd changing amounts of gold shipped. In one instance the per-
sonal records of one of the principal figures in the American pre-
1914 trade in golda manager of one of the largest bankswere
found; there was an almost complete agreement with some of the
figures contained in Table 33 at least as far as New York is con-
cerned.23
This explains why in Table 33 there are sometimes few and
sómethnes many entries for the various countries; we have never-
theless thought it safe to indicate the range of the observations and
to compute the medians which should be compared among each
,other as of equivalent value.
(5) Table 34 contains the gold points for the interwar period,
and Table 35 the detailed figures for the gold points of New York
with London, Paris, and Berlin.24 We believe that this is the first
authentic chronological table that has ever been made, showing
geld points of actual transactions on a massive scale. These figures
can be used for evaluation of those of the preceding two tables. The
differences in the number of entries for the various pairs of coun-
tries in Table 34 is due to the same reasons given above for Table 33.
Sane of these works appeared simultaneously or successively In various
languages, another indication of the widespread use they found among opera-
tors. One of the authors, 0. Haupt, was himself intimately connected with the
finn of Rothschild and engaged in this business. An important work Is N. E.
WeW, Die So&IaritJt dey Geldmdrkte, 1903.
It is clear that a really thorough, and exceedingly expensive, study would
have to use sampling techniques applied to bank archives in the chief centers.
War has made this impossible; but our argument is not really affected by this
lack, since we aim primarily at the construction of a measure of stress, as will
be sean below In Chanter VII.
It will be noted that there are gold points even beyond the date when a
partner had given up the gold standard. This is only an apparent paradox:
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TABLE 34
Post-WorJd.War..1 Goici Points, 1925-1933
New York--London
184
'Average for period January 1926.-May1931 weighted by the number of months each quotationwas valid.
Extreme q'iotations during thesanle period; cf. Table 35 and footnote 25in the text.
W. F. Spaidin& A Primer of ForeignExchange, 1925,p. 36. Paul Einzig, International GoldMovements, 2nd ed., 1931,pp. 148-149. Date refers to year for whichquotation was made.
W. F. Spalding, Dictionaryof the World's Currencies andForeign Ex- changes, 1928,p. 84.
Otto Swoboda, ArbItrage, 1928.
'Paul Einzlg, Economic Journal,March 1927, pp. 133-139. Paul Einzig, Economic Journal,Sept. 1927, pp. 480-483. 'Eigit days, 4.5% interest.
1Seven days, 3.5% interest.
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W. F. Spalding 435312i 4.9067









Average for period October 1926-May 1931 weighted by number of months
each quotation was valid.
Extreme quotations during the same period.
'Average for period October 1926-June 1928 weighted by number of months
each quotation was valid.
Extreme quotations during same period.
'Panty changed June 25, 1928.
Average for period July 1928-May 1933 weighted by number of months each
quotation was valid.
'Extreme quotations during same period.
'Tate, Modem Cambist, 1929 ed.,p. 121.
Source
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TABLE 34, continued
New York-Berlin
Gold export Parity Gold import





























COldeip0,t point London(1W per .)pom ton (1W per £) 20.429 (RM per£)
'Paul Einzig,Economic Journal,March 1927,pp. 133-139. b ToBerlin.





'Henry Deutsch,Arbitrage In Bullion,Coins, Shares,etc., 1933,p. 35.
Assumed gold isbought onopen market. 'Four days; 5%interest. Two days;6% interest. k
Handwortei-buch desBankwesens,p. 235. 'P. Einzig,Insernatloiv4 GoldMovements, 1931,pp. 152-153; date refersto
year for which
quotation was made, To Bremen.
Two daysinterest; 2.5%,airmail. Op. cit.,p. 178, example takenfrom FinancialNews, May 12,1927.





W. F. Spaldmg' 20.3894' W. F. Spalding 20.3882' P. Eluzig 20.381' H. Deutsch' 20378k
W. F. Spaldling 20.31474' U. Deutsch 20.37433
Ilandwörterbuch des
Bankwesen? 20.3628 P. Einzlg, 1930' 20.3626 P. Elnaig, 1930 20.3584b H. Deutsch
20.3558k Tate
20.348 W. F. Spatding' 20.33

























'W. F. Spakling. A Primer ofForeign Exchange, p. 40, assumed 0.4% ex-
penses.
Parity changed June 25, 1928.
'Op. cIt., pp. 38, 118.
'Op. cit., p. 121.
Paul Einzig, International GoldMovements, 2nd ed., 1931, p. 151.Date re-



































No data on gold pointsavailable before the paritychange on June 25, 1928.
bOp. cit., P. 184.
'Two days; 6% interest;airmail.
'Quoted by the author asgenerally assumed value ofgold point.
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TABLE 35








Apr. 22Aug. 1Nov. 29 Dec. 15 Export 4.89914.899654.88865 4.88810 Mint par4.86658
Import4.84974.851844.85184 4.85187
1928
Jan. 24Mar. 23 May22July .18 Export 4.888084.88862 4.889044.88958 Mint par4.86658
Import4.85242 4.851874.851444.85084
.1929
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The detailed figuresfor the New York gold points25 are computed
to fiveand even six decimals; someof those in the other tables, too,
go to fivedecimals. This is a further indication that veryfine ad-
justments are sometimesneeded and meaningful. It also shows
that the questionhow stable the gold points were over along
period is dependent uponthe degree of fineness of the required
information. If we goonly to two decimals, most gold pointswill
be stable (seeespecially Table 35). But when we finddivergence
in the information upto that comparatively lowdegree of accuracy,
pertaining to the same year orperiod, then we may assume that
this shows realdifferences in information, sample, typeof shipper,
rounding of figures, meansof transportation used (truck, rail,air),
place of destination, oracceptance of gold, etc.
Considering that gold transactions coversuch a wide variety of
forms with no informationavailable as to their relativesignificance
for the total, the bestalternative is to take the averagesand the
ranges of the data.The medians seem most suitable inthe present
case and weconsider them simply as our goldpoints for the two
periods. It will be seen that we aresufficiently well informed to
decide in a broad sensethe main issues raised bythe solidarity
hypothesis. This is enhancedby the observations aboutthe period
for which short-term investmentswere made (cf.Chapter III).
We shall keep the discussionof our various gold points to
the barest minimum since we arenot primarilyinterested in them,
but in their applications.However these few commentssuggest
themselves. Table 35 shows the greatstability of gold points forthe
postwar years, althoughit comprises aperiod of many major
changes in internationalfinancial re1atiois, such as, e.g.,the easy
money policy, the greatstock exchange collapse inOctober 1929,
the various reparation crises, etc.The changes in interestand
freight rates were apparently toominor to affect the costsof ship-
ment significantly.
We now turn to the exchangerates and discussfirst the Jre-
The New York data on gold points,1928-1933, come from animpeccable
source which, however, cannotbe disclosed. The transactionsat these gold
points were large and probably asfrequent as gold shipmentsshown by Amer-
ican Import end export statistics.It is likely that othergold points were also
found in New York at that period,but It Is exceedinglyimprobable that they
were narrower than those ofTable 35. So whatever biasthere may be, if any,
in our choice of these figures, it is inthe direction of statingthe most unfavor-
able situation for those who might want toargue that thegold points were not
far enough apart. In other wordsthese figures give thebest possible facta1
basis for testing Lord Keynes' assertions(to be taken fromTables 74 and 75).
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queney distributions (Tables36 and 37 andCharts 9to 11) they are likelyto produce informationabout theirbasicstructwe as distinguished from theircyclical behavior.We useseasonallyun- corrected data (cf.section 9); thereasons need not berepeated sjn they are essentiallythe same as thosegiven in Chapter1V forinter- est rates and theirdifferentials. Theseries are ofuneven length, ranging from 463to 329 months forpre-World-War-Iand of months for 1925-1931,and 55 months forthose involvingFrance; it might thereforebe questionedwhether theresultingmeasures are strictly comparable.But the numbersare in any casevery large for the mainperiod, so that thereis little doubtas to the directcom- parability. Thepost-World-War-inumbers are(with thestated exception) equalbut small,so that while theyare comparable among each other, theyshould not beinterpretedtoo freely when compared withthose before thewar. The mintparities arenoted in eachcase; the gold pointscan be found inTables 33 and35. In view of thegreat differencesin the "fineness"of thequotations, the class intervalscannot be thesame, but thosechosenseem essen- tially satisfactory.26
We shallnot discuss thedistributions toany great extent,hut they will beused againbelow in section7. The graphs9 to 11 contain, superimposedfor thoseseries whereit was possibleto com- pute them, alsothe distributionsof the "derived"exchange rates, i.e., thoseobtained for thesame pair viaa third market.They will be discussedbc. cit. Thechief caveatregarding thedistributions must be withrespect to theevaluation oftheir skewness.Except- ing BerlinNewYork (prewar)all areconsiderably skewed,as the coefficientx shows. The -sign isarbitrary becausethe rate could just as wellhave beenpresented forthe respectiveothercurrency than for thatchosen, withthe resultthat we wouldhave a mirror image of thepresent graphs.There isno way of choosingbetween them; buteachone leads, mtstatismutandis, to thesame interpreta- tion. Theskewness,especially ifmeasured fromparity aswe shall do presently,expresses ofcourse "weakness"or "strength" ofone
Frequencydistributions ofexchange rateshave occasionallybeen deter-
mined forvarious reasons.Cf. especiallyF. C. Mills,Statistical MethodsAp-
plied toEconomics andBusiness, NewYork, 1924,pp. 105 if. But thepurpose
there is entirelydidactic. Heshows thedistribution ofthe LondonNewYork
rate, 1882-1913(384 months)with a largerclass interval(of 0.050) than
ours. Statistics,approachingdistributions, butwithout theircustomary measures,
are found inH. D. White,The FrenchinternationalAccounts, Cambridge,
1933,p. 158 for the NewYorkPansrate.
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TABLE 36































Class Frequency Class Frequency
25.09G-25.105 5 20.320-20.329 4
25.106-25.121 8 20.330-20.339 12
25.122-25.137 24 20.340-20.349 12
25.138-25.153 31 20.350-20.359 19
25.154-25.169 41 20.360-20.369 11
25.170-25.185 45 20.370-20.379 21
25.186-25.201 46 20.380-20.389 21
25.202-25.217 33 20.390-20.399 22
25.218-25.233 42 20.400-20.409 27
25.234-25.249 32 20.410-20.419 21
25.250-25.285 29 20.420-20.429 24
25.286-25.281 15 20.430-20.439 30
25.282-25.291 32 20.440-20.449 24
25.298-25.313 16 20.450-20.459 52
25.314-25.329 20 20.460-20.469 40
25.330-25.345 8 20.470-20.479 26
25.346-25.381 5 20.480-20.489 27
25.382-25.377 5 20.490-20.499 19
25.378-25.393 3 20.500-20.509 19
25.394-25.409 1 20.510-20.519 7
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TABLE 37
Frequency Distribution, Exchange Rates, Postwar,Seasonally
Uncorrected Data













































































'Owing to the erratic behavior of these rates






before January 1927 the dis-
(table continues)





16.48-18.49 12 25.375-25.399 3
16.50-18.51 2 25.400-25.424 5
16.52-16.53 4 25.425-25.449 4
16.54-16.55 25.450-25.474 5








Mint par 16.447 RM
Arithmetic mean 16.483 RM 25.504 fc
Median 16.483 RM 25.517 fc
Mode 16.454 RM 25.534 fc
Standard deviation 0.049 RM 0.073 fc
Coecient of variation0.003 0.003























*4.866 Arithmeticmean *4.8558 Median
$48578 Mode
$48609 Standard deviation




































Sowcs: Tables 38and 47.
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SOLiDARITY OF THE MONEY MARKETS
of the currencies. The extent to which the mean deviates frommint
par is also an indication of how often or rarely that value wasas.
sumed, which is of importance for part of the discussionof an
equilibrium rate. The coefficient of variation is everywheresmall;
it is greatest for Paris-New York. In general thedistributions arc
of frequently encountered forms and offernone of the peculiarities
that will be observed later (cf.,e.g., Tables &3, 84, 86).
The role of parity (mint par)was noted before. Examining the
distributions, it is evident that the peaks donot, as a rule, occur at
this value buton either side of it. This shows clearly that mint
parspeaking now of the period before 1914 onlywasrarely en-
countered. It is in each case contained inan entire class of many
more rates, hence the actual parity itselfoccurs--exactly_.-on1. in
rare instances. If we stretch the notion ofpanty to an entire (arbi-
trary) class interval27 containing theexact value, the resultsare
not impressive. These intervals showfrequencies of only slightly
over 10 per cent of all data for NewYork-London and Berlin-New
York, in the other instancesthe percentages areeven less though
they refer to apparentlymore highly integrated markets. If the
balance of paymentswere out of equilibritim in over 90per cent of
all months it would bea poor showing indeed.
If we take theaccurate value of mint par, the showingis cor-
respondingly worse. Tables 38and 39 give the dates whenthe in- frequent event occurredand their percentages interms of the total number of observations.They are absurdly smalland deprive the idea of an "equilibrium"thus defined of all valuefrom a prac- tical and theoreticalpoint of view. Atany rate an identification of
an average with "normal" leadsto very different results. Inthat sense we also note that thedistribution of the dates whenmint par was reached is in noway significant as faras domestic business cycles are concerned.Futhermore there isnot one single instance when either beforeor after World War 1 thecurrency of anyofthe four countrieswas simultaneouslyon mint par against the respectke three others. If mintpar were the equilibriumrate then a country would also have to bein equilibrium inregard to all others with which it trades.28
We may, however,review the skewness ofthe distributions in In order to allow fora statistical concept ofit and to do away tosome extent with the varying finenessof scale.
Jt could be objected thatthey areaverages and that it is askinutoo much that the underlying dailyor weekly figures shouldaverage out for tTiree values simultaneously to parity. Thisis true, but inspectionof the figures enteringinto
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TABLE 38
Exchange Rates on Parity and Number of Occurrences, Prewar,
Seasonally Uncorrected Data
BERLIN NEW YORK BERLIN PARIS BERLIN
LONDON LONDON PARIS NEW YORK NEW YORK
jJY- Jan. 1878 Jan.18.78 Jan. 1876Jan. 1876 Mar. 1887-
1914 July 1914 July1914 July 1914 July 1914 July 1914
j. 1881 May 188.4 July 1879 Mar. 1879 Nov. 1888 Oct. 1891
pee. 1882 Oct. 1888 May 1881 Jan. 1884 Sept. 1902 Sept. 1896
l)ec. 1885 Feb. 1889 Feb. 1899 Feb. 1890 Aug. 1912 Oct. 1903
july 1887 Mar. 1893 Oct. 1901 June 1894 june 1905
Nov. 1895 Mar. 1894 Oct. 1902 July 1901 jan. 1910
Jan. 1907 Sept. 1895 Oct. 1905 Oct. 1904 Nov. 1911
Oct. 1895 Dec. 1905 Oct. 1910 Dcc. 1911
Dec. 1895 Oct. 1907 Aug. 1913 May 1912
May 1896 Feb. 1910 Oct. 1913 May 1913
Jan. 1899 Feb. 1911 Mar. 1914
Apr. 1899 Apr. 1911 Apr. 1914







6 17 12 9 3 12
Percentage of observations
1.4 3.9 2.7 1.9 0.036
order to measure the "firmness" and "weakness" of the four cur-
rencies in a conventional way. It is the habit of money markets to
call a currency weak when it is (persistently) below mint par and
strong in the opposite case; or, in terms of the gold points, it isweak
(strong) when it nears the gold export (import) point. In this sense
we obtain the figures of Table 40 bysimply counting the number
of months when a currency was below parity without weighting the
quotations according to extent or persistency of the deviation.This
is shown as a percentage of the total observations; Table 41 gives
the result of chi-square test applied to them in order to take into
account the influence of the differences in the sizeof the samples.
the averages shows that it does not happen then either. A so..called equilibrium
rate (holding in all three directions) would then describe a veryunstable
equilibrium, lasting only for a day or so. This is hardly what is looked for.
2050
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TABLE 39
Exchange Rates on Paritya and Number of Occurrences, Januaiy
1925-December 1931
(84 month.$)
PAB5- BEBLLN- NEW YORK- BERLIN- PMIS- BERLIN
LONDON LONDON LONDON PARIS NEW YORK NEW Y0B
Apr. 1929 Feb. 1926 July 1926 Dec. 1929 Apr. 1930 Dcc. 1925
July 1928 July 1930 Jan. 1930 Feb. 1928
Aug. 1921 June 1930 Aug. 1926
Sept. 1927 Sept. 1926
Feb. 1928 Sept. 1929
May 1931 Mar. 1931
Apr. 1931
Totals
1 6 2 3 1 7
Percentage of observations
1.2 7.1 2.4 3.6 1.2 8.3
'There are no seasonals in the exchange rates in thepost-World-War-I period.
There are two immediate comments: (a) before1914 the dollar
was weak in all three possible cases; after 1925 sterlingwas weak
in its three relations; according to the 1925-1931observations, the
dollar was weak against Berlin only; (b)the percentages differ
from one period to the other, and "weak"currencies tend to be
weaker after 1914 than before this date.
(a) The pre-1914 weakness of the dollaris in all three cases
greater than that of the other three. This uniformweakness can
probably be linked to the debtorposition of the United States,
the vacillations of Americanmonetary policy, the nationwide dis-
cussion of bimetallism, the great violence ofAmerican crises. Since
the United States wasa debtor country, its treasury noteswere
often offered in Europe, especiallyin Paris; but currency weakness
is not an inevitableconsequence of a debtor position. The weak-
ness of sterling in Paris is also noteworthy. Boththese relationships
should be compared with those ofthe interest rates discussedin
Chapters III and IV, with which thereare great similarities.29 It is
difficult not to seea systematic connection between the behavior
of these two fields. Indeedwe shall get a strong indication ofit
in a later part of the investigation.
In the 1925-1931 period sterlingshowed a weaknessvery much
Cf. especially Table 26 and theattendant discussion onpp. 137-138.
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TABLE 40
Weakness in Exchange Rates, Prewar and Postwar
207
'See Table 38 for periods covered.
bSignificant; see Table 41.
'Highly significant; see Table 41.
'Period covered for this pair: July 1928-December 1931; July 1928-December 1938.
like the prewar weakness of the dollar. This will hardly surprise
the student of postwar finance. Having stabilized in 1925 after a
sharp appreciation of sterling, Britain was unable to carry out the
implied deflation or to maintain a high volume of activity. Thus
the value of the pound was under considerable internal pressure.
To this must be added the tendency to export capital to high
interest countries, notably Germany and the rest of Central Europe.
Thus the weakness of sterling and dollars in Berlin is particularly
interesting, and also showssince the dollar was weak there even
before 1914 for entirely different reasonswhat caution is necessary
in interpretation. Now there is no doubt that both, especially the
dollar, were "sounder" than the Reichsmark, which had just emerged
from an enormous inflation and was the currency of a country
faced with a huge reparation debt. But it was also the heyday
of large Anglo-American loans to Germany, both short-term and
long-term. As a consequence these currencies were in great supply
in Berlin and the Reichsniark was in demand in New Yorkand
London. This shows that the currency of the lending country may
fall, depending, of course, on the use made of the loan. Inthis
PREWAR PERiODt
POSTWAR PERIOD
JAN. 1925-DEc. 1931 JAN. 1925-nrc. 1938
USJlGE Weak Per cent of Weak Per cent of Weak Per cent of
BATE currencyobservationscurrencyobservationscurrencyobservations
Pails-.
London sterling 57.2b sterling 54.8 sterling 68.7'
London mark 58.0 sterling 72.6' sterling 86.3'
New York-
London dollar 58.0' sterling 81.0' sterling 58.5
Berlin-
Pans franc 58.7b franc 52.4' franc 57.1'
Paris-
New York dollar 65.6' franc 61.9 dollar 56.5
Bn-
New York dollar 68.6' dollar 53.6 dollar 61.3'SOLIDARITY OF THE MONEY MARKETS
TABLE 41












Weaka 248 216 iflI 223 Atparityorflrm'ius
Berlin-London












At parity or firm 205
New York-Paris
8.305 0.001 (p <0.0
Mar. 1887-July 1914
Weak 302
At parity orfirm 161
New York-Berlin
44.788 p < 0.001
Weak 213 158
Atparityorfirm 116 171
36.838 p < 0.001
Postwar, January l925-December 1931b
London-Paris
Weak 46 41
At parity or firm 38
1.1910.2 <p < 0.3
London_Berlin
Weak 61 39




At parity 18 44
Berlin-paris
87.418 P < 0.001
Weak 20 19
At parity Or firm 22 23
Paris_New York
0.09(30.7 < p <0.8
Weak 52 41




At parity or firm 39 46
2.3540.1 <P <0.2GOLD POINTS AND EXCHANGE RATES
Weakness and firmness apply to currency of country or first named city.
bPeriod covered for BerlinPath: July 1928December 1931.
'Period covered for BerlinParis: July 1928December 1938.
case, Cermany cUd not buy primariiy, say, investment goods in
the United States and England, which would have prevented
the weakening of the pound and the dollar. Instead financial
operations dominated industrial expansion.
(b) We discuss the differences in the percentages together with
the chi-square test as shown in Table 41. The difference between
the percentages in Table 40 for prewar and post-World-War-I is
large enough in most cases to be immediately significant; therefore
we need deal no longer with that table but with Table 41.
The chi-square test was used in measuring the significance of
the observations of weakness or firmness in the exchange rates.
It was assumed that the actual observations of the rates on parity
would be the same as the expected observations. Therefore in
computing the expected observations of weakness and firmness the











Postwar, January 1925December 1938'
LondonParis
Weak 112 83 20.027p <0.001
At parity or firm 56 85
LondonBerlin
Weak 145 81 90.648 p <0.001
At parity or firm 23 87
LondonNew York
Weak 96 83 4.0240.02 <p < 0.05
At parity or firm 72 85
ParisBerlin
Weak 72 59 5.3860.02 <p < 0.05
At parity or firm 54 67
New YorkParis
Weak 95 83
At parity or firm 73 85 3.4290.05 <p < 0.10
New YorkBerlin
Weak 103 80 12.623 p <0.001
At parity or firm 65 88210
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the total number of observations; then it was assumed that half
the expected exchange rates would be weak and half firm and
the significance of the observed rates from these expected rates
was measured.3° This might perhaps be interpreted as an accept-
ance of mint par as the equilibrium rate, but this is not our in-
tention. We take it simply as a point of departure, following the
habit of money markets.
It is necessary to state which probability level may be considered
satisfactory for chi square. This is to a high degree arbitrary, but
in the absence of a deeper theory one should be guided by
statistical practice in such cases. A probability p0.01 is generally
found sufficiently low, and where it occurs data may be accepted
as significant; but p < 0.001 isstill more desirable, making its
occurrence highly significant. These are the levels we shall admit
in this study.3' Our concentrationon the probability value of chi
square makes it unnecessary to deal with chi square separately.
Applying this to the chief period, i.e., that before 1914,we see
immediately that the dollar weakness is indeed themost out-
standing phenomenon withp < 0.001 in all three previously dis-
cussed instances. The weakness of sterling in Parisis also far
from accidental.
For 1925-1931 two values give againp < 0.001. The significant
two axe the weaknesses of sterling in New York and Berlin, each
one of a different character from the other, as we have mentioned.
None of the others, including the weakness of the francagainst
the dollar, complies withour standard.
Taking 1925-1938, thereare three values with p < 0.001, espe-
cially the sterling weakness in Berlin havingclii square = 90.648,
the highest of the entire series. But itmust be ruled out together
with the (lesser) dollar weakness there.This is because of the
German exchange control and its previouslymentioned conse-
It might be repeated that "weakness" refersto those times when the rates
are between parity and the gold export point and "firmness" whenthey are
between parity and the gold import point. Also, ifthe currency is wea]c for
one country of a pair, the other is obviously finn. But both could beweak or firm regarding a third country. Recall, however,that there are only three In-
dependent rates. The chi-square test is appliedon the assumption that the
observations, i.e., the exchange rates,are independent in successive months.
Since the successive observations are probablypositively correlated, the prob..
abilities attached to the values of chisquare are underestimated.
' The levels chosen must clearly be in closecorrespondence with the ac-
curacy of the basic data and the kind of relationships dealt with.SEASONAL VARiATIONS
quences. There remains only the sterling weakness in Paris; but
it cannot be accepted either, the franc having been part of the
gold bloc while the pound was devalued in September 1931. With-
out consideration of the historical background the statistics alone
might lead to erroneous interpretation.
Summarizingwe find that, to the extent to which "weakness" is
acceptably defined by using the conventional form of a deviation
from par, currencies will be "weak" for at least two entirely
different reasonsbecause of a debtor position and when the
country is in gross unbalance, showing continued difficulties in
preserving its gold reserves, flight of capital, or inability to deflate
its price levels; or when it is a large capital exporter and its currency
becomes available in great quantities in a few centers because
of the use of the loans.
The discussion of the frequency distributions should be greatly
extended, especially by dissecting the period before World War I
into shorter intervals and making distributions for these. This device
will actually be used in another field (cf. Table 88). But the present
distributions are not of a singular character; furthermore new
light will be thrown on them in the study of the "derived" or
"cross" rates of exchange whose histograms were already shown in
the charts above.
Section 5. Seasonal Variations
(8) The seasonal variations of exchange rates32 are often quite
marked and depend according to a widespread view mostly on those
of foreign trade, especially when agricultural countries are involved
at least on one side. Table 42 and Chart 12 give the indexes for the
periods covered up to 1914. There are no apparent seasonal varia-
tions after World War I, either for the shorter gold and gold
exchange standard period, or for the years beyond. So whatever
seasonal influences were then still exercised on the exchanges by
foreign tradeand they certainly existedwere effectively nulli-
fied by central banks and, to some extent, by forward exchange
operations. This can, of course, only be said for the short period
of comparatively stable rates, while those beyond it either showed
Limitations imposed upon the interpretation of seasonal variations of series
showing relations as the exchange rates are discussed in the correlated case of
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Seasonal Indexes of Exchange Rates, Prewar, 1876-1914






















































































































.JFMAMJJASONOSOLiDARITY OF THE MONEY MARKETS
fluctuations which were hundreds of times the amplitudes of
the former, or entirely artificial rates whose stability is meaning-
less and need not be considered.
The seasonal variations before 1914 deserve a few remarks. To
begin with, foreign exchange rates have often been studied from
the point of view of their seasonal behavior and some noteworthy
early studies have been produced which sometimes had an in-
fluence beyond the field of foreign exchanges by drawing attention
to, and actively influencing the study of, statistical methods of
dealing with seasonal fluctuations. We make our comments b'st
in the form of a number of separate observations.
First, the season'l indexes have changed fairly frequently. The
total deviations show everywhere the same unmistakable tendency,
allowing for a single exception for t'early and brief period 1877-
1884 for Paris-London. Whether there were many or few changes
in the indexes, every new index shows smaller total deviations than
the preceding, with a very considerable drop over the whole series
of indexes for each exchange rate. The largest deviations originally
involved New York. It is knoi that the central banks in the
European countries long before 1914 considered it their dutyto
work toward rliminishing seasonal fluctuations in the exchanges.
Among the European countries these fluctuationswere milder
because their countries were more involved in highly diffused
industrial trade with one another, which is less influencedsea-
sonally than agricultural trade. The latter originated, then,very
largely from the United Statesas well as frommany other overseas
countries, e.g., Argentina, exercising a strong influence.
Second, it was noted abo'e onp. 138 that in spite of great
instability of the seasonal indexes of short-terminterest rate
differentials, there was a steady decline of theirseasonal fluctua-
tions throughout the years. This was in turn associated withthe
basic drop in seasonal 1luctuation of theconstituent interest rates.
Since we are set to examine the interdependence ofinterest rates
and exchange rates, this correspondence is ofconsiderable signifi-
cance and a second indication of possibly a functional connection
between these two fields.The interdependence has not yet been
established; it is only the preliminaryacceptance of the mechanism
of short-term capital movementsas a heuristic device.
A similar development in the over-allnature of seasonal indexes
"The first onewasmentioned in the discussion of Table 41, also relating
to the interest rates.SEASONAL VARIATIONS
of two different categories of economic activity does not prove
per se an interrelationeither between these activities or between
their seasonal characteristics. In this case, however, there is a
connection via the risk factor thatis associated with capital
movements. When the attraction of a higher interest rate abroad
appears, it is important to know whether this differential is of a
seasonal nature and whether the exchange rate between the
countries has a parallel or contrary seasonal movement. The am-
plitudes of both seasonals are therefore of considerable importance.
The operators, carrying out shifts of substantial amounts of capital,
took these small variations into account.34
The interdependence referred to is on the seasonal level first of
all, and it is not certain that it extends beyond it. The interlocking
of seasonal variations will occupy us especially in dealing with
discount rates (cf. Chapter VIII, section 4). It is a much more
extended phenomenon that has been curiously neglected in business
cycle studies even on the purely domestic level.35 Because of the
great stability of these fluctuations its study may lead to rather
definite quantitative information of a type not yet gained in the
more difficult field of the larger and less stable business cycles and
other fluctuations.
Third, what were the typical seasonal changes? In order to avoid
misinterpretations, the reader must recall that the first place name
in Table 42 shows the currency which must be paid in order to
obtain a unit (or units) of the other currency. So if the seasonal
index falls, it means that less has to be paid, i.e., that the currency
of the first place stiffens, while the other falls; mutatis snutandis,
when the index rises. With this in mind we observe the following:
The last three exchange rates on Table 42 and Chart 12 show
dearly that the dollar used to stiffen quite uniformiy from August
until the end of the year. This was attributed to the shipment of
American agricultural products to Europe, but as noted before it
was a more universal phenomenon related to autumnalshipments
from overseas. Their financing extended over several months, hence
the prolongation of the weakness beyond the harvest shipping
periods. The shapes of the seasonals involving the dollar are rather
stable, even while the above-mentioned decline in the total devia-
tions was taking place.
For further details on this point see section 7.
See, however, S. Kuznets, Seasonal Variations in Industry and Trade,
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1933.
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Not so with the exchange rates involving the threeEuropean
currencies only. The relations of the mark to the francand t.
sterling are not dissimilar; this can be seen whencomparing ti'e
shift from strength of the mark in October to December,to weak-
ness in these months during 1906-(1907)--1914. The relatiofl5}1)
between the franc and sterling is the least clearlydefined and
the most unstable, since thereare not less than five indexesto
cover 1877-1914. It would require a very detailed studyto reveal
their deeper significance,a study which is not within ourprovince
The parallelism between both thesecurrencies on the one hand
and the dollar on the othersuggests that there is lessreason to
expect well-defined and stable seasonal variationsfrom the trading
relationships of the two financially highlydevelopedcountries than there is for theiroverseas connections. Therefore theseasonals here seem to be muchmore of an induced than anautonomous character.
Section 6. Forward Rates ofExchange
(9) Forward rates ofexchange-_so..caljed "futures"-_belongto large fields ofeconomic activities of highimportance. While for-
ward transactions ingrains, cotton, some metals,etc. have been studied in considerabledetail for many decades,forward ex- change ratesare as a whole insufficientlyexplored. Interest in them was revived largely due toLord Keynes and P.Einzig;36 the latter's voluminowork discussesextensively and competentlylarge parts of the precedingliterature, besidescontaining some originalin- vestigation. Our discussionwill be limitedto the interwar gold standard period of thecountries concerned.
There are threeseries: New York-London,Berlin-London for
J. M. Keynes, A Tracton Monetary Reform, London,1923, and his contrjbutious to theReconstrujon number ofthe Manchester Guardian,1922; and P. Einzig, TheTheory of ForwardExchange, London, 1937. We mention further:C.. Demaria, 1 Saggtdi Riporto e di Deportodella Lfra italiana a Londra del1921 and 1928,Milan, 1928; theMonetary Review, League of Nations,Economic IntelligenceService, l936-1937.pp42-51, which contains a brief explanationof forward ratesand statistics for1931-1937 with a running historicalcommentary.
J. Casainaor, Le Morchéd Terme desChanges en France,2nd ed., Paris, 1925, describes Frenchconditjous; Germanpractices are described,more from the businessaspect, by J. Vogel,Des DevlsenternjiflgeschaftBerlin, 1924, and by C. A.Fisher, DesDevisentermlngescha,t insemen Bezkhungen stir Wdhrung undWirtschaft, Berlin,1928. Morerecent writers follow mostly Keynes and Einzig.
218CHART 13
Three Months Forward and Cable Exchange Rates, New YorkLondon,
ParisLondon, Berlin4onclon, 1925-1931






























ekly data, 1925-1931, from F. EinzIg, TheTheory of Forward Exchange,220
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TABLE 43
Frequency Distribution, Three Months Forward Exchange Rates,Postwar
NEW YORKLONDON BERLtNLONDON FAIUSLONI
jts. 1925-juix 1931 JAN 1925-JuLY 1931 JAN. 1927-JuLy
($per) (RMper) (fcpi.)



































Owing to the erratic behavior ofthese rates before Januaiy1927, the distribution was made for the period followingit.
January 1925 to July 1981.The data are computedfrom P. Einzig's37 weekly data, whichare in the usual form ofstating premiums or discounts. By applyingthese to thespot rates we expressed the forward rates in themanner of the latter. Theyare shown to-
His data are in turnextracted from a circularof the Anglo-Portuguese Colonial and OverseasBank Ltd. Othersources are the usual financial journals, but those used byEinzig seem to be themost satisfactory.
2 20.16-20.17 2 122.80-122,89 1 20.18-20.19 123.40-123.49 2
1 20.20-20.21 1 123.50-123.59 1
20.22-20.23 1 123.60-123.69 2
20.24-20.25 123.70-123,79 6
1 20.26-20.27 123.80-123.89 17
20.28-20.29 123.90-12.3,99 7
20.30-20.31 124.00-124.09 12
20.32-20.33 124.10-124.19 4 5 20.34-20.35 124.20-124.29
9 20.36-20.37 124.30-124.39
24 20.38-20.39 2 124.40-124.49
14 20.40-20.41 3 124.50-124.59
8 20.42-20.43 12 124.60-124.69
5 20.44-20.45 19 124.70-124.79 1 4 20.46-20.47 13 124.80-124.89 1 3 20.48-20.49 9 124.90-124,99












0.004 0.003 -0.21 0TABLE 44
Frequency Distribution, Excess Spot Exchange Rate Over Three
Months Forward Exchange Rate
FORWARD RATES OF EXCHANGE
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gether in Chart 13 and as to be expected there is a high degree
of covariation in general; it will be described in the proper
place.
First, however, there are the three frequency distributions of
Table 43. Comparing with Tables 36 and 37 we see that the
differences from the mint par are exceedingly small, often a
matter of third and fourth decimals only. This gives certainly a
good idea of the narrow calculations of the market which lie
behind these data. The same is seen from Table 44 showing the
excess of the spot over the forward rate in the same cases.There,
in addition, the very small degree of skewness, even its absence
in the Berlin-London case, are noteworthy and could support
an argument as to the random character ofthese differences-
probably not a permissible inference.










Class Frequency Class Frequency Class Frequency
-0.0100 to -0.0076 8 -0.14 to -0.13 3 -2.25 to -2.01 1
-0.0075 to -0.0051 3 -0.12 to -0.11 4 -2.00 to -1.76
-0.0050 to -0.0028 8 -0.10 to -0.0915 -1.75to-l.51 1
-0.0025 to -0.000110 -0.08 to -0.0110 -1.50 to -1.28
0 to +0.002520 -0.08 to -0.0517 -1.25 to -1.01
+0.0026 to +0.0050ii -0.04 to -0.03 11 -1.00 to -0.76 1
+0.0051 to +0.007510 -0.02 to -0.0114 -0.75 to -0.51
4.0.0076 to +0.0100 9 +0.00 to +0.02 5 -0.50 to -0.26
+0.0101 to +0.0125 2 Total -0.25 to -0.01 8
Total 0 to +0.2536
+0.26 to +0.30 8
+0.51 to +0.75 2
+0.76 to +1.00
Total
Arithmetic mean $0.0015 0.06 RM +0.053 fc
Median $O.0016 0.06 RM +0.118 fc
Mode $0.0018 0.06 RM +0.221 fc
Standard deviation $0.0051 0.04 RM 0.427 fc
Coefficient of variation3.40 0.67 +8.06
Skewness -0.06 0 -0.39S
SOLiDARITy OF THE MONEYMARKETS
TABLE 45
Correlation between Three MonthsForward Exchange
Rates and Spot ExchangeRates
The a prioriexpectation is, ofcourse, for high correlation.The measurements of Table 46 makethe explicitassumption that the individual observationsare independent of eachother. Weobtain there C,a coefficient ofcovariation, whichmeasures thecorre- spondence of the directionof movement oftwo time series.Table 46 gives the largestC0.765 with 0.01<p < 0.02, anone too satisfactory level. Itapplies to ParisLondon,January 1925to July 1931. Thesame series, restrictedto January 1927to July 1931 comes out last. In theomitted months,judging fromTable 48, there was perfectcorrespondence in directionof change.The re- maining two,computed for 1925-1931,are not ''eiysatisfactory
TABLE 46





Jan. l925...jjy 1931Berlin on London 56470.02 <p< 0.050.679 2
Jan. l925-July 1981Paris on London 68600.01 <p< 0.020.765 i
Jan. l927-July 1931Paris on London
370.02 <p< 0.05 0.6444 N Number ofobservatjoof changes.Zero changesin eitheror both ratesare not counted.
Z - Number oftimes the changesin the exchange
rates showed thesame sign. to chance.




















July 1927-July 1931 +0.82 065 0.91
condence coefficient of 99%.DERIVED AND ARBITRAGE RATES
either. This may be due tothe basic assumption of randomness,88
to the existenceof lags,89 or to a rougher ldnd of correspondence
than the fine month-to-month covariation.
Sectkm 7. Derived and Arbitrage Rates of Exchange
(10) A set of computed time series, substituting notimproperly
for direct information that islacking, may be expected to yield
data about international financialcrises and the rise and fall of
tensions in general. These are two groupsof series called "derived"
orlcross,and "arbitrage" exchange rates. They compare the
direct exchange rate between two countries invarious ways with
the exchange rate an arbitrageurmight consider in using a third
market. Sterling can be bought directly in Paris(or equivalently
by selling francs in London) butalso via New York or Berlin.
The latter operation is evidently moreexpensive, time consuming,
and risky and will only be carried outif there is an advantage
connected with it. This could be the case, ifwith proper allow-
ance for costseither (taking New York only) the dollar in Paris
or sterling inNew York sells cheaper than corresponds tothe
existing market ratio of sterling tofrancs in New York.
The intercommunication between all markets,briefly described
in section 1, is, of course, anindispensable assumption and pre-
requisite. It existed during the entireperiod, except from the
summer of 1931 on for Germanywhen exchange control was intro-
duced there. Under such a regime noequalization within the limits
to be observed under free conditionsneed be expected; it is common
knowledge that currencies were then off suchlimits. But even the
quotations themselves are then subject todoubt. We return to
this point later.
The method used incomputing the derived seriescan best be
described by using an example. For derivingthe series Berlin-
Paris via New York the following three series wereused (seasonally
uncorrected): BerlinNew York (units: M per$100); Paris-New
York (units: fcper $1); and Berlin-Paris(units: M per 100 fc).
When fast economic processes yield frequentdata and these are averaged
over long periods, i.e., long inrelation to the speed of reaction, thensuccessive
averages can be considered asindependent of each other, even whenthey
follow in monthly intervals.
Lags are briefly studied in Chapter IX, section6. In general, however, we
avoid them since the qualitative determinationof specific cycles tends to make
them uncertain concepts when several time seriescompared with each other.
It is somewhat different regarding lags withreference cycles.
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Dividing Berlin-New York by Paris-New York(on arnontl1' basis), making the proper correction for the(hiferent devimj
places gives the derived exchange rate Berlin-Paris(M per 100fe) via New York. This series is compared withthe directexchange rate Berlin-Paris by subtracting the direct(actual) exchangerite from the derived exchange rate.
The number of derived foreign exchangerate series thatcould be computed was determined by theunits of the sixdirectex- change series. For the prewar periodthe six directforeign exchange rate series were the following:
New York on London
Berlin on London
Paris on London
Paris on New York
Berlin on New York
Berlin on Paris
Pans on New Yorkvia London
Berlin on Parisvia New York
Berlin on Parisvia London
Berlin or, NewYork vIa Pans
Berlin on New Yorkvia London
unit: $ per £
unit: M per £
unit: Ic per £
unit: fcper$1
unit: M per $100
unit: M per 100 Ic
From these six seriesit was possibleto derive only thefollowing four series:
Berlin on Paris via NewYork
Berlin on Paris via London
Paris on New Yorkvia London




(Mar. 1887-July1914) For thepost-World-War-Iperiod (uniformlyJanuary 1925- July 1939) itwas possible to derivethe followingfive exchange rate series fromthe directseries:
unit: fc per $1
unit: RM per 100 fc
unit: BM per 100 fc
unit: RM per $100
unit: RM per $100 The seriesBerlin on Parisvia New Yorkwas made possible by inverting NewYork on Parisand New Yorkon Berlin, getting the correspondingunits in cents,and thendividing the secondnew series by thefirst one. Itshould benoted that thoseseries con- taining Londonas one of thepair could havebeen derived if the necessary inversionsof theexchangerates were made. Forex- ample theseries Londonon Berlin viaParis could havebeen derived byinverting Londonon Paris anddividing into Berlin on Paris.40
'° None of theseries usedare corrected forseasonal variations.7e fleed not
give a detailed
lustification forthis choice,since thereasons are obviouS. Thee
may be a difference
in consideringA on B viaC and B on Avia C. We take only
one directioninto account.DERIVED AND ARBITRAGE RATES
The differentials between the derived and actual exchange rate
series, called "arbitrage series," are plotted on Charts 14 and 15.
For each of the two periods the scales were determined by making
them comparable to the ratios of the parities for the exchange rates
involved. This is not quite the case for the series Paris on New
York via London. Here the scale is two-thirds the relative scale
of the other series in the prewar period, but comparable to the
other scales in the interwar period. This means that the amplitude
of differentials plotted is slightly smaller than it might otherwise
be for this series.
The prewar and post-World-War-I periods were made compar-
able by adjusting the scales in those cases where there was a parity
change from one period to the next; otherwise the scales are the
same inasmuch asthe same units are used for the derived series of
the two periods.
There is one other point which should be kept in mind in
regard to the graphs of these series; that is, that the fineness
of the differentials (the number of digits used) was determined
for each series by the number of digits quoted in the original series.
Therefore when these differentials are plotted the changes in some
cases seem to be moremarked than in others. For example this
is true for the two series for Berlin on Paris where,excluding the
zero possibility, the smallestdifferential is 0.01 RM per 100 fc
which is a large difference relative to the parityl642 RM per
100 feand correspondingly the plotting of thisdifference is rela-
tively large compared to a unit change of some of theother series.
If the original series were quoted with one moredigit then the
differential may have proved to be 0.006 RM per 100 fc.All this
means is that the two mentioned seriesshow more abrupt changes
in the differential than do the other series, due tothe rounding
off. This is an insignificant matter and should notaffect the com-
parisons of the various differentials.41
The rounding off of figures even in relatively simplemathematical and
statistical computations is in general, however, far from innocuous.This is not
duly considered, as a rule, in many economic applications. In ahighly theoreti-
cal field, for example, that of numerically solving equationsof the Walras-Pareto
type, the decision whether or not the detenninantvanishes is not possible
without using great numerical detail of a kind usually notavailable in the
required quality.
In the present instance questions of this typefortunately do not seem to
arise. They are treated in 0. Morgenstern. OnThe Accuracy of Economic Ob-
eruations, bc. cit., especially section 8 andthe technical literature quoted
ther
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CHART 14Arbitrage Series, Differences between Deriveriand Act0
The monthly timeintervals are so large,relative to the speed with whichreactions in this sphere ofactivity are assumedto take place, as to obliterateall possibledifferences due to theslight varia- tions in the underlyingseries regarding sight,short, and cable drafts and transfers;no problem whatsoeverarises for the period after World War I whenall quotatloosare for cable transfersuni- formly. Wecan therefore dismissthe thought thatany sizeable number of deviationsfrom thepermissible range aroundzero had to do witha (theoretical!)imperfection of the data. This conclusionseems justified inspite of the factthat after World War I, duringthe fewmonths of universalgold standard in all fourcountries (end of 1927until fall of 1931),the five series behaved almostperfectly in thesense of expectationswhile there1'
5
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Berlin-Paris, via New York
'yl! vvrrr
Berlin-Paris, via London
Berlin-New York1 via London
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1900 1905 19W 1914
Source: For explanation of denved rates, see the accompanying ted.
were hardly any such phasesfor all series simultaneously for a
similar number of months before 1914.
(11) The subsequent brief discussion of thederived series falls
into two parts: first, we examine their stable properties asrevealed
by the frequency distributions, and second, we determine acertain
class of deviations in order to correlate themroughlywithother,
similar ones indicative of aforementioned internationaldisturb-
ances.
In order to avoid misunderstandings we point outthat the
frequency measures are made for the derived seriesthemselves, so
that these distributions can be directly comparedwith those of
the direct (spot) exchange rates given in section 4 andwith those
of the forward rates of section 6 of this chapter.
To elucidate the character of the derived rates morefully, the


















AxbA-troge Senes, Differences between Derivedand Actuo
Exchange Rates, Monthly, Postwar, 1925-1939
Berlin-Ports, via New York
Berlin- New York,vja Paris
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pre-Worid-WarI period is shown as a whole and then broken up
into two parts, the second for all series uniformly of 223months,
while the first varies from 06 to 216 months due to the known
differences in coverage of the basic data (see the appendix to
this chapter and Table 47). All measures for the entire series can,
TABLE 47












8 80.25-80.29 2 2
80.30-80.34 3 3







80.70-80.74 15 12 3
80.75-80.79 17 12 5
80.80-80.84 18 13 5
80.85-80.89 25 18 7
80.90-80.94 24 16 8
80.95-80.99 29 17 12
81.00-81.04 31 17 14
81.05-81.09 42 19 23
81.10-81.14 38 17 21
81.15-81.19 32 10 22
C 81.20-81.24 19 5 14








Arithmetic mean 81.01 M 80.85 M 81.17 M
Median 81.05M 80.88M 81.1SM
Mode 81.13 M 80.94 M 81.20 M
Standard deviation 0.269 M 0.233 M 0.192 M
Coefficient of
variation 0.003 0.003 0.002
Relative skewness0.45 0.39 0.16















Arithmetic mean 81.00M Median 81.03M
Mode 81.0gM
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'This period was chosen insteadof 1818-1914 in order to have thedistribu-
lion comparable to the "spot" prewarseries.
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BERLIN-N1W OflL VIA LONDON
(Mper$100)
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TABLE 47, concluded
232
PAB1S-NEW YORK VIA LONDON
(fcper$1)
Jan. 1878-July 1914Jan. 1878-Dec. 1.895Jan. 1896JJ4Tj
ci.*ss Frequency Frequency Frequency
5.135-5.139 1 1
5.140-5.144 3 3
5.145-5.149 17 11 6
5.150-5.154 35 15 20
5.155-5.159 40 18 22
5.160-5.164 43 13 30
5.165-5.169 31 9 22
5.170-5.174 44 19 25
5.175-5.179 31 12 19
5.180-5.184 24 9 15
5.185-5189 27 12 15
5.190-5.194 30 15 15
5.195-5.199 22 10 12
5.200-5.204 19 9 10













of course, be compared directlywith the original series andsuch
a comparison gives a good idea howwell the indirect seriesap-
proximate the originally givenones.











Arithmetjcmean 5.l8Ofc 5.l8Bfc 5.l7Sfc Median 5.175fc 5.183fc 5.172fc Mode 5.165 fc 5.177 fc 5.166 fc Standaid deviation
Coefficient of vail-
0.024 fc 0.029 fc 0.018 fc
ation
Skewness
0.005 0.006 0.003 +0.62 +0.31 +0.50DERIVED AND ARBITRAGE RATES
one would expect.The three derived series, BerlinParis, Paris
New York, and BerlinNewYork (all via London), are of the same
length (1878-1914) and therefore broken intoalmost equal parts
(216 and 223 months). Thusthe very significant result (which
however also obtains for thefourth, BerlinParis via New York)
is of interest: the dispersion ismarkedly lower for the second
part of the whole periodthan for the first. This is best seen by
comparing the coefficients of variation42which in each case are
substantially lower for the later than for theearlier half-period.
Since these series coincidefor all other practical purposes with
the direct exchange rates, theobservation holds for these too.
The meaning of this is immediate: greaterstability of exchange
rates prevailed in thesecond period, and since this is observed in
all four cases itexpresses a greater stabilityof international
financial relations to the extent that theserelations are carried
on throughexchanges. This would be their bulk at any rate.The
decline in the extent of fluctuations is notdissimilar to that of
the absolute maximal interest ratedifferentials, studied in section
3 of the preceding chapter.
Table 48 contains the distributionof BerlinNew York via Lon-
don for 192.5-1981, the only onemade for the interwar period.
Comparison with the direct rate(Table 37) shows very high
similarity with a smaller standarddeviation, but the same co-
efficient of variation. This sampleshows that the post-World-War-I
relation of the derived to the direct ratesis not different and we
need not go further into this matter.
(12) We now turn to the arbitrage series proper,i.e., the differ-
ence between thederived and direct exchange rates.They are
presented in Charts 14 and 15.Although these differences were
very small andseemingly insignificant, they areof considerable
interest. This pertains to boththeir frequency distributionsand
their time sequences; as mentionedthere may even be cycles in-
volved or other significant propertieshelping in identifying inter-
national tensions or crises.
The charts are easy to read: eachseries is centered around a
zero line which indicatesthat there was zero differencebetween
the direct and derived rates. This istaken to mean that it was
It will be noted that the standarddeviations and the coefficients ofvaria-
tion for the spot rates are equal to orlower than those for thecorrespondin
derived rates. This greater spread amongthe derived rates probablyresulted
from the added cost of going through athird center.
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TABLE 48
Frequency Distribution, Derived Exchange Rates, Januaiy
1925July 1931, Seasonally Uncorrected Data
BERLIN NEW YORE VIA LONDON
(RMper$UX)
Arithmetic mean 419.9 JIM
Median 419.9 JIM
Mode 419.9 RM
Standard deviation 1.07 JIM
Coefficient of variation 0.003 JIM
Skewness 0
indifferent how therespective other currencywas bought, directly or via the third place.Clearly this is not exactlyso since we do not know anythingabout the costs, especiallynothing about their possible changes andperhaps even seasonalor cyclical variations. When thecurve is above thezero line, then the derivedrate was higher than the directrate and accordingly, whenit fell below, it was lower than thedirect oneor, in other words. itwas profit- able to buy via theintermediate market. So whenthe curve was above thezero line the balancing flowof funds would berestricted to the twocountries dfrectJinvolved; its directionwould of course depend upon theactual position ofthe rate andupon the short- term unbalance of themoment. When thecurve was below the


















DERIVED AND ARBITRAGE RATES
zero line, a flow amongthrce countries would be a distinct possi-
bility44 but no certainty.
Flows to and from the third country are induced only as dis-
tinguished from the autonomous flows arising in the first case.
The amounts involved may in each case be very large but we
lack data on that point.
What are the reasons for larger oscillations or other kinds of
deviations from a true zerothis being the difference45 between
the two rates where no profit can be made by interchanging the
three currencies involved? Certainly not variations in costs, risk
factors, and the like. The only plausible interpretation aside from
the rejection of the data as inaccuratefor really free and im-
hampered markets, such as existed before 1914 and for a few years
after World War Iis that demand and supply of the currencies
could not be absolutely equated as between the three centers. In
other words, "tips" or "excesses" of demand or supply remained
which had to be settled by securities, gold, and even other com-
modities. This is, however, a condition that does not square with
the theory of foreign exchanges of which the basic principles were
expounded in section 3.
Still worse, the continuation of a difference from the true zero
over a number of weeks and months would run counter even to
the crudest conceptions of the working of an international monetary
mechanism, no matter what the standards involved may be. We
must except only regimes of exchange controi. Then deviations
are not only possible, but bound to appear,and when they are
absent, it would indicate wrong or falsified statistics.
Therefore we ask: are there such permanent differences? And
where is the true zero? The latter question must be answered first.
Unfortunately it cannot be determined with accuracy and we
can only make some guesses. These, however, canbe backed by
suggestive observations. Consider first the post-World-War-Iperiod
(Chart 15). In three cases (Berlin-Paris via London, Berlin-Paris
via New York, Paris-New York via London) our empirical zero
clearly coincides with the true for the years during which all four
gold standards were operating; there were then hardly any devia-
tions at alJ.Those that occurred are therefore true deviations
too.
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"Assuming that it was a deviation from the "true" .ero (see below).
It may be a narrow zone of positive and negative values.
"This depends of course also on the unit of measurement.Therefore thisSOLiDARITY OF THE MONEY MARKETS
It should be recalled that this highly perfect equalization falls
into a period when forward rates for each currencywere also
available. This offered twoor more additional avenues of equalizing
and they may have contributed to the high degree of perfection.
Outside the period quoted but still after 1914, the deviitionsarc
enormous compared with anything found before 1914, yet forward
rates existed. Whatever stabilizing influence the lattermay have
they do not by themselvesassure equalization of cross rates of
exchange.
Before 1914and perhapseven after 1931we find no such
behavior of the data. With the exception of thesix and a half
years 1908-1914 for ParisNew York via Londonno series os-
cillates for any length of time around theempirical zero shown
on the graphs. Instead they stay either aboveor below it, often
for years on end, though still undergoingvariations. This would
suggest seeking the true zero for these periods inan average of
the deviations themselves andto measure the latter from it. But
this is made difilcult ifnot impossible by the curious fact that,
e.g., BerlinParis via London hasup to about 1894 an average
below zero, then for approximatelysixteen years above, and finally
oscillates around the empiricalzero. There is no information of
any kind available that would make this behaviorplausible; in
particular we do not know whetherthere were such rather gradual
changes in costs (perhaps fees,commissions, taxes, etc.) that had
this infiuence.
Since this must remainan open question it is necessary to neglect
all small variations aroundthe empiricalzero or around the
different means, whena series is for a longer period aboveor below
the empiricalzero. Account may be taken if themean (which we
shall not compute; itmay be seen roughly from the charts) changes
sign. There are furthermoresome over-all tendencies that the
charts disclose amply forour purposes. These are the over-all
tendencies, visible for allseries before 1914, ofa contraction of
each series and generallysmaller oscillations aroundthe properly defined zeros. This ishardly surprising after havingseen the
smaller dispersion of thesecond part of the frequenciesfor the derived rates (Table 47).The early parts of thepre-World\Var.j arbitrage series are decidedlymore erratic than the last. This is
condition could always becreated. We need not elaboratethis point and its obvious consequences.
This may have been connectedwith shifts in the interestrate differentials.DERiVED AND ARBITRAGE RATES
especially true for Paris-New York via London, which for 1878-
jcertainly differs widely from any conceptionone might form
about this type of series.
Whether the prewar or post-World-War-I series are considered,
there are no cycles to be found, whatever visual criterion might
be applied.48 Instead there appear the kind of sudden "outbursts"
mentioned earlier, which reappear in a totally different field else-
where.49 They are of interest for discovering specific dates of
trouble in these international contacts. Before determining these
dates we will discuss the frequency distributions of the arbitrage
series.
Tables 49 and 50 show these distributions. The first two for the
pre-World-War-I period are of 439, the last two of 329 and 439
months; all those for the post-World-War-I period are of 79
months. The question of units arises again, aggravated by the
choice intervals. The reader will determine for himself whether
he considers the distributions as comparable.
Their differences are striking. Taking first the pre-World-War-I
statistics they show each one belonging to a separate class of the
typical textbook variety. Comparison with Charts 14 and 15, show-
ing the four time series, makes this immediately clear. The expecta-
tion for the ideal case would of course be a very narrow and per-
fectly symmetric distribution. That for Paris-New York via Lon-
don corresponds best, though its symmetry leaves much to be
desired (skewness,x = +0.833).If the part from 1878 to about
1888 were omitted the results would conform much better to
expectation and would have eliminated the hump from ±0.025 to
+0.029 fc. A somewhat wider class interval would also have made
the symmetry greater. Berlin-New York via London also conforms
not badly with the expected shape; but this cannot be said of the
other two. The question of symmetry can here be raised signifi-
cantly, while for the direct and derived series, as was pointed out,
there is no interseries comparability, since each one can be inverted
with no preference for either form possible. in these two cases the
' There may be complicated cycles in these series. They could be discovered
only by means of Fourier and spectral analysis and the attempt may be made
elsewhere.
example, in the discount rate of the Bank of France (cf. Chapter VIII,
section 5). There are other instances. It is not unlikely that this is a type of
economic fluctuation deserving further study. We referred to this so section 5
of Chapter I as particularly pertinent for interactions of various countries.
These corms have also some bearing on sun spots, wirich also may not be
"cyclical" in a simple sense of continuous phenomena.
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TABLE 49






-0.36 to -035 1
-0.l6to-O.15 1
-0.14 to -0.13
-0.12 to -0.11 2
-0.10 to -0.09 5
-0.08 to -0.01 13
-0.06 to -0.05 25
-0.04 to -0.03 43
-0.02 to -0.01 66
+0to +0.01 71
+0.O2to+0.03 78
+0.04 to +0.05 78
+0.06 to +0.07 41
+0.08 to +0.09 7
+0.lOto+0.11 4
+0.12 to +0.13 4
439
Arithmetic mean +o.00g M
Median +0.013M
Mode +0.021 M

































































-0.38DERiVED AND ARBITRAGE RATES
TABLE 49, concluded
greatest frequency, occurring very near theempirical zero, may
indicate the location of the true zero. Only a veryradical enlarge-
ment of class intervals would help in that respectin the other two
cases. The units there, being fairlylarge in the first place, make this
impossible.
The most perfect frequency distribution inthe sense of our
expectation isthat for Berlin-Paris via New York1925-1931
(Table 50). There all averages are zero as is theskewness; hence
no coefficient of variation exists. Theother postwar distributions
too show a much more regular behavior thanthe pre-World-War-I
data. These parts of the entire post-World-War-Iperiod make it
therefore most plausible that the true andthe empirical zeros
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BERLINNEW YOBL VIA LONVON
(MAR. 1887-JULY 1914)
(Mper $100)
PARIS-NEW YORK VIA LONDON
(JAN. 1878-jui. 1914)
(fcper$1)
Class Frequency Class Frequency
-2.0 to -1.9 1 -0.025 to -0.021 1
-1.8 to -1.7 -0.020 to -0.016 1
-1.6 to -1.5 -0.015 to -0.011 4
-1.4 to -1.3 1 -0.010 to -0.016 32
-1.2 to -1.1 -0.005 to -0.001 179
-1.0 to -0.9 +0to +0.004 123
-0.8 to -0.7 4 +0.005 to +0.009 20
-0.6 to -0.5 13 +0.010 to +0.0 14 15
-0.4 to -0.3 13 +0.0 15 to +0.0 19 12
-0.2 to -0.1 26 +0.020 to +0.024 11
+0 to +0.1 55 +0.025 to +0.029 28
+0.2 to +0.3 108 +0.030 to +0.034 8
+0.4 to +0.5 68 +0.035 to +0.039 5
+0.8 to ±0.7 26 +0.040 to +0.044
+0.8 to +0.9 10 +0.045 to +0.049 1
+1.0 to +1.1 1 +0.050 to +0.054 1
+1.2to+1.3 1
+1.4to+1.5 3
+2.4 to +2.5 1
Total Total 439
Arithmetic mean +0.22 M +0.0031 fc
Median +0.25 M +0.0001 fc
Mode +0.30 M -0.0059 fc
Standard deviation 0.40 M 0.0108 fc
Coefficient of variation + 1.82 3.484
Skewness -0.20 +0.83Class
BERLIN-PARIS VIA NEW YORK
(RM per 100 fc)
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TABLE 50
Frequency Distribution, Arbitrage Rates, January 19.















Arithmetic mean 0 0.001 RM Median o
Mode o
Standard deviation 0.045 RM
RM
Coefficient of variation 0.020 RM
Skewness o 20.0
0.45
coincide for all practicalpurposes. An extension of this hypothesis
for the wholepostwar period is admissible,especially since the
functioning of arbitrage isindependent of the standard.°
We summarizesome of the main points of thearbitrage series: sudden andeven large deviations fromzero (where the empirical
need not coincide withthe true zero)are in keeping with any freely operatingmonetary standard, includingall forms of the gold standard, althougha monthly tmit for the observationsis very large. When deviationsare extremely large theyindicate criticaloc- currences; when theyare only moderately large butlast for more than one to twomonths they betrayinefficiency of the operating capital transfermechanism or institutionalchanges, e.g., exchange control, openor disguised. The sharpestdeviations show clearly such importantcrises or disturbancesas the 1890 Baring crisis, the
10This is easilyseen from the charts, whichfrequently fail to show deviations, even though only someor none of thecountries were on the gold standard. Furtheore even the1925...1031 gold standardwas more restricted, e.g., hardly any domesticcirculation of go'ld, thanthat prior to 1914.
Frequency Clgs.s
1 0.08 to 0.07 1
3 --0.06 to 0.05 2
0.04 to 0.03 5
1 0.02 to 0.01
7 0to +0.01 57
6 +0.02 to +0.03 1
44 +0.04 to +0.05 2
11 +0.14 to +0.15 1
5
1
79 TotalVIOLATiONS OF GOLD POINTS
TABLE 50, continued
Arithmetic mean -0.15 B.M -0.11 RM
Median -0.05 RM +0.02 RM
Mode +0.15 RM +0.19 RM
Standard deviation 0.88 RM 1.03 RM
Coefficient of variation -5.87 9.36
Skewness -0.34 -0.29
(table continuer on next page)
1907 strain on international relations, the great turmoil of 1893,and
even milder ones, e.g., 1902 (Table51). In the post-World-War-I
period the great upheavals of 1931, 1983, and 1936 are allclearly
distinguished and the extent of the disturbance of our series is an
indication of their severity. However, besides the confirmationof
these crises and disturbances, there are others less easilyidentified.
Section 8. The Violations of Gold Points bythe
Exchange Rates
(13) The two Tables 53 and 54 contain for each pairof countries
the monthly dates at which the exchanges wentbeyond the gold
points in. either direction. The latter are found on topof each
column; both the medians and the widest excesses arenoted. For
each month the actual exchange rate observed isshown from sea-
241
BERLiN-NEW YORK VIA LONDON
(RM per $100)
BERLIN-NEW YORK VIA PARIS
(RM per $100)
Frequency Class Frequency
1 -8.4 to -8.3 1
-0.5 2 -0.6 to -0.5 5
-0.4 -0.4 to -0.3 8
-0.3 1 -0.2 to -0.1 22
-0.2 10 0 to +0.1 29
-0.1 24 +0.2 to +0.3 5
0 80 +0.4 to +0.5 5
+0.1 11 +0.8 to +0.7 2




-f-1.6 to +1.7 1
+1.8to+1.9
+2.0 to +2.1 1
Total 79 Total 79S
SOLIDARITY OF TIlE MONEY MARKETS
TABLE 50, concluded
PARIS-NEW YORK VIA LONDON
(fcper$1)
Class Frequency
-0.210 to -0.201 1
-0.100 to -0.091 1
-0.090 to -0.081
-0.080 to -0.07 1
-0.070 to -0.061
-0.060 to -0.051
-0.050 to -0.041 1
-0.040 to -0.03 1
-0.030 to -0.021 8
-0.020 to -0.011 5
-0.010 to -0.001 36
0to +0.009 19
-4-0.010 to +0.019 4
+0.020 to ±0.029
+0.080 to +0.039 1
+0.040 to ±0.049 2
+0.050 to +0.059





Arithmetic mean -0.0059 fc
Median -0.0033 fc
Mode -0.0002 fc
Standard deviation 0.0305 fc
Coefficient of variation -5.177
Skewness
sonally uncorrected data(see, however, Table 56,where corrected data are used)Figures in italic witha single dagger show those
actual exchange rates thatnot only went beyond the mediangold import and export points,but beyond themaxima recorded. So the tables make twomeasurements at Once by distinguishingbetween a severe and a lesssevere criterion of "violation" ofthe principles of the gold standard.Charts 16 and 17 showthese deviations. The
'It would have beeninadvisable to use correcteddata in so delicate a statistic where much weightis placed upon theidentillcation of the actual month and often inseveral countriessimultaneously. The shifting of peaks, mentioned before, often dueto seasonal correction,would have blurred the picture beyond hope. Becauseof averaging this dangeris not a%oided entirely even when uncorrected dataaie used.
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TABLE 51
Dates When Arbitrage Rate Was Greater than ±0.2% of
Parity, January 1888-July 1914
(319 months)
cent' Per cent No. Per cent No. Per cent No. Per cent No.
+ = Differential, excess derived over spot rate was greaterthan +0.2% of
Differential, excess derived over spot rate was greater than -0.2% of
panty.
'Percentages for Cols. 1-4 computed on basis of 319 months. Percentagesfor
Cal. 5 computed on basis of total observations of all rates, 1,276 months.
Berlin-Berlin-












Oct. 1890- 0 11
Dec.1890- + 1 12
Jan.1891 011
Nov.1891- 011
Dec.1891- + 1 12
June1893- - 022




Aug. 1898- - 022
Sept.1896- + 1 12
Dec.1900- 0 11
May1901- 0 11
June1905 + + 202
July1905 + +2 02
Dec.1905- 0 1 1
Jan. 1906- 0 11
Sept.1906 -I-- 101
Dec.1906- + -123
Nov. 1907- - 022
Dec.1907- - 022






+ 0- 0 0 113.4 2 0.6 13 1.0 - 216.6 1 0.8 20.6 6 1.9 302.4
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TABLE 52
Dates When Arbitrage Rate Was Greater than ±0.2% of
Parity, January 1925July 1939
(175 months)
B.'rli,iBerlinBerlinBerlinParis
New York New York Paris viaParis via New York
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+ 218
+ 814









+ 202022202022VIOLATiONS OF GOLD POINTS
TABLE 52, concluded
Berlin-Berlin-Berlin-Berlin-Paris-.
New York New York Paris viaParis via New York
via Paris via London London New York via LondonTotals io+ --123
Junel9S7+ -- 123
Sept.193? + -- 123
JaILlO8S+ 101
Apr.1938 + 101
May1938 + - 1 12
Per Per Per Per Per Per
Jan. 1925-July 1931 No. cent No. cent No. cent No. cent No. cent No. cent
+ 45.10 33.811.311.392.3 - 11.311.367.645.122.5143.5
total 56.311.39 11.456.333.8285.8
Aug. 1931-July 1939
+ 12 12.533.119 19.8 17 17.722.153 11.0 - 16 16.133.112 12.5 1111.566.348 10.0
total 28 29.266.231 82.3 28 29.288.3 101 21.0
Jan. 1925-July 1939
+ 169.131.722 12.6 18 10.331.7627.1 - 179.142.318 10.3 158.684.6627.1
total 33 18.974.040 22.9 3318.9 116.3 124 14.2
+ = Differential positive, cheaper to buy currency directly.
- = Differential negative, cheaper to buy currency through third country.
heavy center line there represents the entire interval between the
median gold points so that all the intermediate variations of the
exchange rates are absorbed and consequently not shown. Violations
of these points-now assumed to be constant over time-are indi-
cated by the areas below or above. The maximum gold points of
Tables 33 and 34 are indicated by broken lines beyond the center
line. It can instantly be seen whether the violations vent even be-
yond these maxima. At the same time a picture is obtained of the
extent of the deviation of the maximal gold points from themedians
and it is seen that for the same country the deviation is sometimes
bigger in one direction than in the other.2 The deviations have
been shown when they actually occurred; when there was an in-
This is here a purely statistical consequence and must not be confused with
the fact that the upper and lower gold points often are at different distances
from the currency par. The actual difference is due, as already mentioned in
footnote 20, to differences of costs of shipping gold in different directions be-
tween the same countries. This condition is often artificiallycreated by the





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Deviations of Exchange Rates from the Gold Points,
Prewar, 188O-194
Medion width of voId points------ Mosimum width of gold points
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SOLiDARiTY OF THE MONEY MARKETS
CHART 17
Deviation of Exchange Rates from the GoldPoints,
Postwar, 1925-1934
Median width of gold points
Maximum width of gold points
(Ichor'Qe
















1925 '26'27'28 '29 '3031
Berlin-London
p'r'.






























4.910 New York- London
4.9097
4.90Q
& 4.895 NewYe,k vloll
4.84 - 48503-4.5913
4.840 .8432 London vloIt.i 1925 '26 2Y"j'j''30'31
20.53
Brkn violote*
20.374 20.501terval of at least one month between two (or more) occurrences, a
unifonn spatium has been left; when the' lasted for more than one
month they are shown as continuous.53 1ars in which there were
no violations areomitted. Thus theçaphs give as complete
a pictureof violations of the gold staard principles as can
be obtained. The charts andgraphs are soanged that the devia-
tions directed upward are "violations" ofe first named money
market always, since the graph shows thatd to what extent
the price of the other currency went beyond one or the other kind of
gold export point. The deviations directed downward then show by
necessity "violations" of the currency of the sec9nd named money
market.
Table 55 is a more easily read summary of some aspects of
the data presented in Tables 53 and 54. In the prewar period Paris-
Berlin was the most frequent violator of the median gold points,
while Berlin-New York, closely followed by Berlin-London, vio-
lated them least often. When the maximum gold points are used the
picture changes somewhat, Paris-New York becoming the worst
violator and Berlin-London the best behaved. The unequal in-
crease in the width of thegold points from the medians to the
maxima accounts for this slight shift in relative positionof the
rates. It has already been pointed out that themedians are really
a lenient" set of data,if the entire variation of the data on gold
points is considered.54 Therefore this difference should not cause
too much concern.
In the postwar period London and Berlin are the onlyviolators
of the gold points, the former being the greater offender,especially
when paired with Berlin.
When the same computations are made for seasonallycorrected
exchange rate data it is shown that such violations were not just
seasonal events.
Charts 16 and 17 show the deviations from the two cate-
gories of gold points on a directly comparable basis sothat devia-
tions of the same size (plus or minus) represent the same amounts
of money on the basis of currency par. This representationhas to be
supplemented by showing the percentages of the deviationsfrom
the basis of the two gold point variants (Tables 56 and57). The
Consult Tables 53 and 54.
"As far as the exchange rate deviations beyond the goldpoints are con-
cenied, the medians are the more severe standard and the maximumgold
points are a lenient measure (ci. pp. 191 if.).
VIOLATIONS OF GOLD POINTS
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TABLE 55
Frequency of Deviations of the ExchangeRates from
Median and Maximum of Gold Exportand Import
Foints, January 1880-July 1914b and1925._1931c
New YorkLondon
VIOLATIONS VIOLATIONS
OF IMPORT POINTS OF EXPORT POINTS OTAL VIOLATIONS
MedianMaximwnMethanMaximumMedianMaximum gold points gold pointsgold points gold pointsgold points goldpoints




























1896 1 - 0 1897 0 0
1898 0 n
1899 0
1900 0 0 1901 0 n
































gold points gold pointsgold points gold pointsgold points gold points
(continuea on next pages; notes on page 263)
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OF EXPORT POINTS TOTAL VIOLATIONS
1880-1914
Unadjusted for
seasonal 18 2 27 2 45 4
As per cent of
total obserVationSd 4.3 0.5 6.5 0.5 10.8 1.0
Seasonally adjusted 20 8 19 3 39 6
As per cent of
total observations 4.8 0.7 4.6 0.7 9.4 1.4
1925-1931
Unadjusted for
seasonal 0 0 11 0 11 0
As per cent of



































































































OF IMPORT POINTS OF EXPORT POINTS TOTAL VIOLATIONS
MedianMaximum MedianMaximumMediuiMaximum




As per cent of
totaTlobsen'ation?
seasonally adjusted





As per cent of
totAl observations
(continues on next pages; notes on page 263)
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23 12 20 17 43 29
5.5 2.9 4.8 4.1 10.4 7.0
12 1 16 0 28 1
2.9 0.2 3.8 0 6.7 0.2
0 0 0 0 0 0




OF IMPORT POINTS OF EXPORT POINTS TOTAL VIOLATIONS
MedianMaxünuniMedianMarirnwn























































































































































































gold points gold pointsgold points gold points
18 1 42 16
4.3 0.2 10.1 3.9
16 9 39 12
3.9 2.2 9.4 2.9
5 1 5 1
13.5 2.7 13.5 2.7




&s per cent of
total observaU0I" 5.8 3.6
Seasonally adjusted 23 3
As per cent of




As per cent of




OF IMPORT POINTS OF EXPORT POINTS TOTAL VIOLATIONS
MedianMaximum MedianMaximumMedian axinw gold points gold pointsgold points gold pointsgold points goliJpoj,













































1930 0ViOLATIONS OF COLD POINTS
TABLE 55, continued
Berlin-New York






OF EXPORT POINTS TIYFAL VIOLATIONS
MedianMaximum MedianMaximumMedianMaximum
points gold pointsgold points gold pointsgold points gold points
1880-1914
unadjusted for 8
seasonal 5 5 3 3 8
















total observationS4 2.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 4.0 3.0
1925-1931
Unadjusted for seasonal 9 0 0 0 9 0
As per cent of
total observations11.4 0 0 0 11.4 0S
VIOLATIONS VIOLATIONS
OF IMPORT POINTS OF EXPOUr POINTS TOTAL VIOLATIO
MedianMaximum Maximum
1880
gold point., gold pointsgold points gold pointsgold points goldpoü
1881 0 0 0 1882 0 0 0 1883 0 0 0 1884 0 0 0 1885 0 2 2 1886 0 0 0 1887 0 0 0 1888 0 0 0 1889 0 0 0 1890 0 1 1 1891 0 5 5 1892 0 0 0 1893 0 3 3 1894 0 0 0 1895 0 0 0 1896 0 0 0 1897 0 0 0 1898 1 0
1 1899 1 0 1 1900 3 0 3 1901 o 0 0 1902
0 0 1903 2 0 2 1904 0 0 0 1905 0 0 0 1906 2 A











































OF EXPORT POINTS TOTAL VIOLATIONS
MedianMaximum MedianMaximum MedianMaximum
gold points gold pointsgold points gold pointsgold points goldpoints
1880-1914
Unadjusted for
seasonal 15 1 11 0 26 1















As per cent of
total observations4 2.4 0.2 1.9 0.2 4.3 0.5
1925-1931
Unadjusted for seasonal1 0 14 0 15 0
As per cent of
total observations 1.3 0 18.7 0 20.0 0S




OF IMPORT POINTS OF EXPORT POINTS TOTAL VIOLATIONS
MedianMaximum iedianMaximum
gold points gold pointsgold points gold pointsgold points goldpoinu
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1880 0 2 2 2 2 1881 0 0 0
1882 0 0 0
1883 0 0 0
1884 0 0 0
1885 0 0 0

































































































1 1VIOLATIONS OF COLD POiNTS
TABLE 55, concluded
Berlin-Paris
Exchange rate data are unadjustedfor seasonal variation except for the second summaryof
1888-1914. Cold points are those ofthe second named place for each pair.
For New York-Berlin periodcovered is March 1887-July 1914, 329 months.
Period covered for six pairs of countriesobserved.
New york-London, January 1925-August1931 (80 nio.)
Paris-New York, July 1928-December 1931(42 mo.)
Paris-London, July 1928-July 1931 (37 mo.)
Berlin-New York, January 1925-July 1931 (79mo.)
Berlin-London, May 1925-July 1931 (75 nb.)
Berlin-Paris, July 1928-July 1931 (37 mo.)
415 months except for New York-Berlin.






OF EXPORT POINTS TOTAL VIOLATIONS
MedianMaximum MedianMaximum MedianMaximum
points gold polnisgold points gold pointsgold points gold points
188O19l4
Unadjusted for
seasonal 30 2 21 18 51 20
As per cent of
total observationS4 7.2 0.5 5.1 4.8 12.3 4.8
Seasonally adjusted 28 2 19 9 47 11
As per cent of
total observations4 8.7 0.5 4.6 2.2 11.3 2.7
1925-1931
Unadjusted for
seasonal 1 1 0 0 1 1
As per cent of
total observations 2.7 2.1 0 0 2.7 2.7Jan.18800.17 Sept. 18800.01 Aug. 18800.04-
Aie 18800.12 o.18800.07 Sept. 18800.15 o.cte Sc t1880036 Nov. 18800.09 Oct. 18800,08
Oct. 18800.31 Dec. 18800.17 0.08Feb. 1881007
Nov. 18800.40 0.03 Jan. 18810.05 Mar. 1881o.o
Dec. 18800.58 0.21 Mar. 18810.17 0.06Apr. 1881 0.01 -'' Jan.18810.13 Apr. 18810.05 Oct. 18810.05
Mar. 18810.29 Feb. 18820.49 0.44Feb. 18850.10 o Apr. 18810.12 Mar. 18820.31 0.26Mar. 18820.19 0:10 Aug. 18810.12 Apr. 18820.37 0.32Apr. 18850.19 o.o Sept. 18810.15 May 18820.55 0.50 Nov. 1888on 0.02 Oct. 18810.13 June 18820.33 0.28Dcc. 18860.18 o. Feb. 18820,17 July 18820.16 0.11Jan. 18870.11 o.g May 18820.18 Aug. 18820.23 0.18Feb. 18870.23 014 ''
. Dee. 18820.11 Mar. 18840,12 0.07 Max. 18870.21 012 Mar. 18830.29 Apr. 18840.12 0.07Sept. 18870.27 ole Oct.18830.14 May 18840.12 0.07Oct. 18870.22 0.13 Nov. 18830.10 Nov. 18840.01 0.07Dec. 18870.04
Dec. 18830.10 Dcc, 18840.01 Aug. 18880.13 0.04 Mar. 18840.13 Feb. 18880.16 0.11 Sept. 18880.35 oj Apr. 18840.13 Mar. 18880.16 0.11 Oct.1888017 0.08 Aug. 18840.09 Apr. 18860.04 Dec. 1888026
Oct1884017 Sept. 18860.03 Jan. 18930.04 Nov. 18840.19 Oct. 18860.11 Aug. 18930.01 Dec. 18840.15 Nov. 18860.19 0.08May 18970.09 jan.18860.01 Dec. 18860.45 0.38june 18970.08 Dee. 18860.13 Aug. 18870.13 0.02July 18970.09 Aug. 18870.08 Sept. 18870.43 0.32Nov. 18880.01 Mar. 18890.09 Oct. 18870.24 0.13July 19000.01 Apr.18890.09 Nov.18810.03 Oct.19000.01 May 18890.08 Sept. 1891ikl9 0.08Nov. 19000.06 Oct. 18910.09 Oct. 18910.15 0.04Dec 19000.13 0.03 Dec. 18910.08 Apr. 18930.06 0.01Jan. 19010.01 May 18930.14 Dec. 18940.04 May 19040.05 :: July 18930.17 Jan. 18950.00 0.01Dec. 19050.05 Mar. 18950.11 June 18950.14 0.09Jan. 19060.01 Apr. 18950.15 July 18950.14 0.09Apr. 1906 4
June 18950.10 Apr. 18960.02 June 19080.01 July 18950.28 0.08 May 18960.08 0.03July 19080.01 Aug.18950.33 0.12 Mar. 18980,15 0.04Oct. 19080.06 Sept. 18950.13 Apr. 18980.24 0.13Nov. 19080.09 Nov. 18950.09 Oct. 18980.05 Dec. 19080.01 Dec. 18950.09 Mar. 19070.13 0.02 Jan.18960.14
Sept.19080.08
Average per omit




counuy 0.18 0.12 0.18 0.16 0.04 013 Average deviation
of exchange rates
from export poia













gold gold gold gold
DATE poiots*poMtsb DATE poèib polite DAre!ZPLINNEW YORK
PERCENT PERCENT

















































































10 Nov. 18930.09 Nov. 18870.17 0.11
Dec. 18930.04 Dee. 18870.30 0.24
19 Apr. 1898 0.11 Mar. 18880.09 0.02
12 Dec. 1899 0.03 Sept. 18880.05
4 Feb. 19000.05 Nov. 18880.05
p2 Apr. 19000.01 Dcc. 18880.09 0.02
8 May 1900 0.02 Oct.18900.12 0.06
Mar. 19030.02 Nov. 18900.12 0.05
Apr. 1903 0.01 Dec. 18900.05
II May 1906 0.01 Aug. 18910.19 0.12
Nov. 1906 0.08 Sept. 18910.31 0.25
8 Feb. 19070.07 Oct. 18910.12 0.06
Mar. 19070.06 Feb. 19000.05
Nov. 1907 0.25 0.13 May 19000.05
Dec. 19070.12 July 19000.02
Feb. 19090.04 Aug. 19000.01


























0.15 0.15 0.06 0.13 0.11 0.09
0.08 0.08 0.06 0 0.16 0.10
0.19 0.19 0.06 0.13 0.09 0.01
'5. o.oiö2.5 0.13 0.01-0.310.01-0.25 0.02-0.37 0.02-0.37
MedianMaximum MedianMaximum
Id gold gold gold gold

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































9VIOLATIONS OF COLD POINTS
arrangement is the same as for Tables 53 and54. The percentages
are of coursedirectly comparable with each other. At the bottom
of each table the averagedifferences are given, and the range of the
percentages in each column.
The postwar situation is muchsimpler. There are only four pairs
for which averages werecomputed. The maximum average for the
medians, 0.20 per cent, is higher than any prewar average.It is
furthermore the value for London, which occursin three of the four
series, in two of them asthe sole violator. The only other money
market is Berlin, with 0.66 per cent, againstLondon. The maximum
deviation, 0.56 per cent, is for London againstParis in March 1931
(0.38 per cent for the maximum goldpoints); itis one point
higher than the prewar maximum deviation.
Therefore, when deviations occurred they wereof not incon-
siderable magnitude, and the fact that London appears soper-
sistently is probably as good an indicationof that market's diffi-
culties as can be had. These difficulties,attributed to the "over-
valuation" of sterling, have previously not beenshown conclusively
by other means, as e.g., by lossof gold, or deterioration in other
items in the British balanceof payments. Our statistics are a Pos-
sible way of expressing them on thebasis of a procedure that was
not made up ad hoc butapplied to a great variety of cases.The
identification of the several hundred instancesin Tables 53 and 54
or, respectively, inTables 56 and 57 is important; thevariations of
the exchange rates can be brought into properconnection with
other relevant data and the dateswhen these show at least as well-
defined critical points.
(16) A further important fact,difficult to reconcile with the
current views, is the contiiwitofdeviations beyond the gold points.
Frequently the rate of one currencywould be beyond the gold
export points for more than onemonth in succession. The devia-
tion of a monthly average need nothave been a deviation every
day or week of that month. Likewisethe same can be said if for
several successive months a deviationof the average occurs. But
the chances are that it represents acontinuous conditionand
deeper lying disturbances. Table 58shows these successiveperiods
from two to seven months. There were,before 1914, not less than
two six-month periods duringwhich sterling and marks were
each beyond gold export points. That isclearly so long, that Mc-
lion and other minor circumstancescannot be applied toexplain
it. There even was one seven-monthperiod with New York as the
267S
TABLE 58
Number of Times Exchange Rates Deviated from Gold poj5




Per cent of months that
were continuous (levi-





Per cent of months that
were continuous devi-
ations of total devia-
tions observed







7 months 0 0
6 months 1 8Berlin
5 months 1 5London
4months 3 12London (3)
3months 0 0








See Tables 58 and 54 for periodscovered.
Number in parentheses indicatesthe number of times the place namedviolated the gold points.
Number of deviations from mediangold points, 215. Number of deviationsfrom maximun gold points, 78.
Only median gold points used.There were nocontinuous deviations from the maxanuin gold points.
Postwar period: number ofobserved deviations, 41.

























































ViOLATIONS OF GOLD POINTS
violator1 FebruaryAugust1882. The total number of months is
distributed over the four moneymarkets (for prewar and post-
war) in Table 59.(There were no continuOus violations of maxi-
mumgold points after World War I.) It is again Paris scoring
worst, with London aclose follow-up.
TABLE 59
Number of Months that Comprised the Continuous Violations
of the Cold Points, Prewar and Posbvar
N5W YOBL LONDON BERLIN PARiS TOTAL
Post-Pre- Post-Pre- Post-Pre- Post-Pre- Post-
war warwar warwar warwar warwar war
Median 33 4122 35 8 59 16830
Maximum14 2 4 39 59
Section 9. A Special Case
(17) Carl Heiligenstadt's investigation intothe Cerman-British
balance of payments and the theoryof foreign exchange53 had the
immediate purpose of determining to what extentthe assertion by
Viscount Coschen and others was correctthat the Reichsbank
would not always part with gold while theBank of England always
would when circumstances demanded.
Tables 60 and 61 give two time series, oneeach for the gold
import point for London, and forthe gold import point for Berlin
for the year 1890, which is incidentallythe year of the Baring crisis,
for many reasons one of the most interestingand important eco-
nomic disturbances of the latenineteenth century.5° The most strik-
Carl Heiligenstadt, "Beitragc zur Lehre vonden auswartigen Wechsel-
kursen," 3 parts, Jahrbücher für Natlonalökonomieund Statfitik, 3rd Series,
Vols. ivvi, 1892-1893.
' This interest is partly due not only to the cooperationof the Bank of Eng-
land with the domestic banks, but to the support itfound in the Banquc de
France and the Russian Treasuiy, both ofwhich pledged gold. A detailed
account is given in Sir J. Clapham, TheBank of England, Cambridge, 1944,
Vol. n, Chapter vii.
These series were transcribed from a graph, sincethe author does not pub-
lish the figures from which it was constructed; nor wasit possible to reconstruct
the figures from their component parts, which ishardly surprising when one
recalls the many small items that enter into agold point. Nor can the tran-
scription be entirely accurate. Neverthelessthe tables prove of great interest
because of the apparent absence of similarundertakings. The variations of
the gold points within such very small timeintervals as two or three days are
269SOLIDARITY OF THE MONEY MARKETS
ing feature brought out by Hciligcnstadt is unquestional)ly the fact
that the two separate notations of each of the two gold pointsgive
significantly different results (Tables 62 to 64). Table 63 showsthe
gold point for London reached only twice and passed thirteentimes,
0.22 and 1.40 per cent respectively out of 929 observations. Prac-
tically the same percentages should have been recorded inLon-
don for the London import point; but instead thepercentages were
2.79 and 6.72 respectively. In the preceding table thecontrast is
not quite so great but still significant.
As to be expected, the import point of gold wasreached and
passed in twice as many per cent in Berlin as the equivalentexport
point in London. The percentages are very much largerin each
case on Table 62 than on Table 63. Although this is in itselfnot a
guarantee of larger gold flows toward Berlin than towardLondon,
that is indeed what happened, as the last columnsin both tables
show.
It is interesting to note that,as Table 62 shows, gold movedto
Germany in great quantitieseven when the exchange rate in Lon-
don did not nearly as often reachor pass the gold export pointas
sterling fell in Berlin to the goldimport point there. So it could
be argued that the London markrate was not as characteristic and
sensitive as the sterling rate inBerlin. This isHeiligenstadt's
thought. But it could equally beargued that generally theexport
points are not so favorable to goldmovements as are the corre-
sponding country's importpointswith which they shouldbe identical for all practicalpurposes. The same is to be observed,
niutati3 mutandfs, on Table 63.Such could easily be theconse-
quence of central bank intervention, goldpremium, etc., that are
not considered in establishing theother country's gold importpoint. This serves again toillustrate the great complexityof the situation,
shows with whatcare statements in this fieldmust be qualified, and
how difficult it isto establish what the factsactually were.
chiefly (lue to the changesin the interest rate whichHeiligenstacit considered. It was the rate chargedin London for "floatingmoney," in other terms the call money rate. Another variable itemwas the London price of gold bullion; for Germany a gold price1/2 d. higher was takenthan the London quotation (op. cit., Vol. iv, 1892,pp. 838-839). So thereare two variable factors and it is noteworthy that wenevertheless find periods ofover two months in seccession in whiche almost daily quotations
remain unchanged. Costs of transportation and insurancewere kept constant, as isrohable for as shorta period as one year. We know that theseitems remainj thesame even over years.
270ViOLATiONS OF COLD POINTS
TABLE 60
Germany-England, Cold Import Point for London, 1890
(marks per £)















































Yearly average 20.496 Standard deviation 0.084
Median 20.505 Maximum gold point base0.585%
Range 20.445-20.515
Source: Jahrbikher für Nationalokono,nie rind StatLstik, 3rd series,vol. 4, 1892, pp. 817 if.
Translated from graph. The figures themselves are not given, but our averages,median, and
























































4 20.510 420.485 4
720.510 620.500 6




























averageSOLiDARiTY OF TIlE MONEY MARlETS
TABLE 61
Germany-England, Cold Import Point for Berlin,
(marks per £)
Gold Gold Gold Gold
import import import import
Date pointDate pointDate pointDate pointDate pal
Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May
2 20.375 120.385 120.385 120.385 120.
4 20.375 420.385 420.385 320.385 320.
7 20.375 820.3856 20.385 S20.385 620.:'
9 20.375 820.385 820.385 820.385 820.:
10 20.375 1120.3851120.885 1020.385 1020:3
14 20.3751320.3851320.3851220.385 1320:3
18 20.3851520.3851520.3851520.385 1420.3
18 20.3851820.3851820.385 1720.379 1520:3
21 20.38520 20.3852020.385 1920.379 1620..
23 20.3852220.3852220.3852220.379 1720:3







average20.380 20.385 20.385 20.881 20.3k
July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov.
1 20.3652 20.385 120.385 220.385 120.:3
3 20.8855 20.3854 20.385 420.385 420.:3. 5 20.3657 20.8856 20.385 720.385 620.37







Minimiini gold point base
Standard deviation
Per cent width of yearlyaven












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4SOLIDARiTY OF TIlE MONEY MARKETS
Section 10. Sum niar
(18) In this chapter we have dealt with the concept of the inter
national solidarity of money markets. This has necessitated CX1)1or
ing the foreign exchange rates (including the gold points) as the
main expression of such contact.
In the course of this study, we have also been able to observe
certain characteristics of the rates. The seasonal pattern was de-
termined, as well as other, more durable factors. Our studyverified
the weakness of the dollar in the pre-World-War-I years, and the
sterling diculties of the interwar period. These rates were further
studied by examining the crossrates used for arbitragepurposes,
where "violations" were noted, particularly in the Berlin-Parisrate
via New York (in the pre-World-War-I years).
A further study of violations, including the incrediblephe-
nomenon of exchange rates often and persistently beyond the gold
points, enabled us to isolate periods of international financialten-
sion. In general Paris and Berlin were the violators beforeWorld
War I, and London and Berlin in the interwar period. Thusit was
possible to verify observations from othersources that the authori-
ties in these centers had intervened,or that these were periods of
stress.
In the next two chapterswe shall pursue this objective further,
bringing in the influence of theinterest rate. The measurement of
international stress combines thesestrands_-exchange rates, gold
points, and interest ratesgivinga statistical test of this elusive
Concept.
Appendix. Description of theData
Here are the descriptions,as needed, of the six foreign exchange
series which have been chosen.The choice was simple,since there is essentially onlyone exchange rate between twocountries, that is, one only for "spot"quotations. Sometimes there isa futures market
besides. Our monthly dataare, practically, spot prices ofcurrencies. Great care was takenin each case toassure, as far as technically
possible, that the rateswere actual market rates, i.e., thatthey arose from genuine largescale businesstransactions. To be distinguished from theseare the "posted" rates, whichare usually slightly higher. These aremaximal ratesannounced in the respectivemoney
276277
DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA
markets by leading international banks; they were used only occa-
sionally and for smaller individual transactions.'
These are the six series :2
Paris on London: units are French francs. The data repre-
sent the French "cheque" eichange, which up to November 1887
was called "French short exchange." The sources were: for 1877-
1898 and 1909-1914, the Economist; for 1899-1908, the National
Monetary Commission's "Statistics for Great Britain, Germany and
France, 1867-1909" (Washington, 1910), pp. 70-74. The data are
monthly averages and, when taken from the Economist, are com-
puted on the basis of Saturday quotations; the number of Satur-
days in the month were used in determining the average. The post-
World-War-I rates are taken from the London and Cambridge Eco-
nomic Service, which calculates the monthly averages from official
daily average quotations, which come from Reuters. Up to June 24,
1928, parity was 25.221 fc, thereafter 124.21 fc for the pound
sterling.
Berlin on London: units are marks, after 1925 Reichsmarks.
The data represent German short exchange. The sources were as
above under (a) and the computation of the monthly average was
the same also. The post-World-War-I data are from theLondon
and Cambridge Economic Service; they are calculated as above
under (a). There was no change in the parity: 20.430 RM (after
the war the German mark was called Reichsmark).
New York on London: units are dollars. The data prior to
August 7, 1886 represent New York short exchangecalculated
from the sixty-day rate at the current rate of discount, asstated by
the National Monetary Commission, bc. cit.; after that datethey
aie the New York Exchange "cabletransfers." The monthly averages
were computed from rates quotedweekly. The sources are as un-
der (a). The post-World-War-I data are from theFederal Reserve
Bulletin. They are based on noon buying rates forcable transfers
'Cf. A. H. Cole, "Seasonal Variation in Sterling Exchange,"Journal of Eco-
nomic and Business History, Vol. 2, 1929, pp. 203-218.Thispaper refers to
the New York on London rate; the data ,,sed there goback to 1825. Cole
states, pages214-215,that "we are justified in viewing the whole seriesof sight
rate data from 1865 onward as substantiallyhomogeneous." The remark above
in the text refers not only to the New YorkLondonexchange. We have earned
the principle of using actual rates to all exchange rates and, as amatter of fact,
to all our data wherever a similar situation might arise.
'The first three series could be inverted in name;but this is immaterial,
since wherever London is involved there is only onesingle way of stating the
exchange rate. It is never stated in terms of pounds sterling.SOLIDARiTy OF THE MONEY MARKETS
in New York as determined by the New York FederalRese've
Bank. There was no change in party after the A
gold standard in EngLand(192.5;.
(d) Berlin on New York: unitsare marks (or Reichsmarksper
$100 for sight draft. Quotations beginat the Berlin Stock Echange,
March 157. The originalsosirce is the Deutacher Reichwnzeiger,
which publishes daily officialquotations, from which the monthh-
averages were computed as publishedup to 1834 in Vieiteljahrs..
hefte fur Statisjjk desDeutchen Reiches and from 195-191iin
SfajutjschJahrbwh fur dizs Deutsche ReickAs an alternative
source for l88-1907, Volume 21 of thepublications of the Na-
tional Monetarg Commissionmay be consulted.
For the post-World.WIperiod the inverted series of New
York rates on Berlinwas used. The data are monthlyaverages of daily rates for cabletransfers in cents per Reichsmark Theare taken from the FederalReserve Bulletin, which obtains themfrom the New York FederalReserve Bank Parity is 23.82cents per
Reichsmark or 419.81 RMper $100.
(e) Berlin on Paris:units are marks (or Reichsmarks)per 100
francs for eight.day drafts.Original and secondarysources are the same as in (d), with thesame alternative source for 1SS&-1907.
Beginning March 1909official quotations for sightdraft on Paris
became available forevery business day. Thisnew series was used
to check the other for the lastfive years before 1914since the eight. day draft declinedin importance, but bothseries moved closely
together. The monthlyaverages for 1876-1884 and 1910_Juh1914 were computed by the NationalBureau of EconomicResearch on the same basisas the data for the interveningyears, as compiled by the StatistzschesReich.sanzt. ThepostWorld.wj seriesare for sight drafts.These dataare taken from the KOn ftinksur- thztjgfjchpHantjbuch (Berlin,1938) for 1925-1935-thereafter from theVierte4ahrshme zur KoniunkturforschungThey are monthly averages ofofficial dailyquotations. The reader isre- minded of the value,or rather lack of it, ofGerman official quota- tions of foreigncurrencies due to theregune of exchange control. These data are essentiallyduplicated in the FederalReserve Bulletin for the inverserelationship. Theparity was 81.00 RMbefore June 1928, thereafter 16.447RM per 100 fc.
(f) Paris on New York:units are francs, paidup to January 1877 for three-day drafts,thereafter for thedemand (or sight,or short) draft. These differentnames covered howeverthe same draft,as
278
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can be concluded from the Commercial and Financial Chronicle,
which was the source of this series. The monthly averages were
computed by the National Bureau for the major part from rates for
all Fridays, but prior to 1890 from all rates available, when rates
could not be obtained for all Fridays. Beginning with November
14, 1902 all rates are definitely actual market rates, while before that
date only posted rates are available.3 When upper and lower
limits of posted or actual rates are given, as is the case from the
third Friday in August 1885 on, then our rates are based on the
arithmetic average of these two quotations. The margin between
the highest and the lowest quotations is at the beginning usually %
centime (slightly over 0.1 per cent of the average rate) and drops
to as little as 1/32 centime 0.007 per cent of the average rate) at the
end of the prewar series. Incidentally this serves to show the small-
ness of variations involved, and it can only be repeated that,
though they are of concern for operators in the arbitrage business,
these differences become quite unimportant for most statistical
purposes.
For the period after World War I it was found best to take the
inverted series. Thus we have American cents per franc for cable
transfers, the check transfers having declined in importance to such
an extent that publication of check rates wasstopped by the
Commercial and Financial Chronicle in May 1934. The monthly
averages, taken from the Federal Reserve Bulletin, arebased on
noon buying rates, as determined by the NewYork Federal Re-
serve Bank. Parity was established at 3.92 cents inJune 1928, and
at 6.623 cents in February 1934; the first equalled to 25.51francs
per dollar, the second to 15.1 francs.The prewar parity had been
5.183 francs per dollar. The monthly averages used are computed
by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
'About the difference between actual and posted rates, cf. above, page 277
and footnote 1.
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